~ubuntu-kernel/ubuntu/+source/linux/+git/azure:master

Last commit made on 2017-03-24
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ae5d4df... by Stefan Bader

UBUNTU: Ubuntu-azure-4.10.0-1003.3

Signed-off-by: Stefan Bader <email address hidden>

24574d2... by Andy Whitcroft

xfrm_user: validate XFRM_MSG_NEWAE incoming ESN size harder

Kees Cook has pointed out that xfrm_replay_state_esn_len() is subject to
wrapping issues. To ensure we are correctly ensuring that the two ESN
structures are the same size compare both the overall size as reported
by xfrm_replay_state_esn_len() and the internal length are the same.

CVE-2017-7184
Signed-off-by: Andy Whitcroft <email address hidden>

2a1c7e3... by Andy Whitcroft

xfrm_user: validate XFRM_MSG_NEWAE XFRMA_REPLAY_ESN_VAL replay_window

When a new xfrm state is created during an XFRM_MSG_NEWSA call we validate
the user supplied replay_esn to ensure that the size is valid and to ensure
that the replay_window size is within the allocated buffer. However later
it is possible to update this replay_esn via a XFRM_MSG_NEWAE call.
There we again validate the size of the supplied buffer matches the
existing state and if so inject the contents. We do not at this point
check that the replay_window is within the allocated memory. This leads
to out-of-bounds reads and writes triggered by netlink packets. This leads
to memory corruption and the potential for priviledge escalation.

We already attempt to validate the incoming replay information in
xfrm_new_ae() via xfrm_replay_verify_len(). This confirms that the
user is not trying to change the size of the replay state buffer which
includes the replay_esn. It however does not check the replay_window
remains within that buffer. Add validation of the contained replay_window.

CVE-2017-7184
Signed-off-by: Andy Whitcroft <email address hidden>

f4a4538... by Stefan Bader

UBUNTU: getabis: fix source and package list

For now pull from PPA and there is no image-extra package.

Signed-off-by: Stefan Bader <email address hidden>

ee2f83c... by Stefan Bader

UBUNTU: Start new release

Ignore: yes
Signed-off-by: Stefan Bader <email address hidden>

d0f37f3... by Marcelo Cerri

UBUNTU: Ubuntu-azure-4.10.0-1002.2

Signed-off-by: Marcelo Henrique Cerri <email address hidden>

fac5f1e... by Jack Morgenstein <email address hidden>

UBUNTU: SAUCE: net/mlx4_core: Avoid delays during VF driver device shutdown

BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1672785

Some Hypervisors detach VFs from VMs by instantly causing an FLR event
to be generated for a VF.

In the mlx4 case, this will cause that VF's comm channel to be disabled
before the VM has an opportunity to invoke the VF device's "shutdown"
method.

For such Hypervisors, there is a race condition between the VF's
shutdown method and its internal-error detection/reset thread.

The internal-error detection/reset thread (which runs every 5 seconds) also
detects a disabled comm channel. If the internal-error detection/reset
flow wins the race, we still get delays (while that flow tries repeatedly
to detect comm-channel recovery).

The cited commit fixed the command timeout problem when the
internal-error detection/reset flow loses the race.

This commit avoids the unneeded delays when the internal-error
detection/reset flow wins.

Fixes: d585df1c5ccf ("net/mlx4_core: Avoid command timeouts during VF driver device shutdown")
Signed-off-by: Jack Morgenstein <email address hidden>
Reported-by: Simon Xiao <email address hidden>
Signed-off-by: Tariq Toukan <email address hidden>
Acked-by: Brad Figg <email address hidden>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Henrique Cerri <email address hidden>

ec7612d... by Pavel Shilovsky

CIFS: Fix possible use after free in demultiplex thread

BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1670508

The recent changes that added SMB3 encryption support introduced
a possible use after free in the demultiplex thread. When we
process an encrypted packed we obtain a pointer to SMB session
but do not obtain a reference. This can possibly lead to a situation
when this session was freed before we copy a decryption key from
there. Fix this by obtaining a copy of the key rather than a pointer
to the session under a spinlock.

Signed-off-by: Pavel Shilovsky <email address hidden>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <email address hidden>
(cherry picked from commit 61cfac6f267dabcf2740a7ec8a0295833b28b5f5)
Acked-by: Brad Figg <email address hidden>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Henrique Cerri <email address hidden>

636d713... by Pavel Shilovsky

CIFS: Allow to switch on encryption with seal mount option

BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1670508

This allows users to inforce encryption for SMB3 shares if a server
supports it.

Signed-off-by: Pavel Shilovsky <email address hidden>
(cherry picked from commit ae6f8dd4d0c87bfb72da9d9b56342adf53e69c31)
Acked-by: Brad Figg <email address hidden>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Henrique Cerri <email address hidden>

1bb15b9... by Pavel Shilovsky

CIFS: Add capability to decrypt big read responses

BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1670508

Allow to decrypt transformed packets that are bigger than the big
buffer size. In particular it is used for read responses that can
only exceed the big buffer size.

Signed-off-by: Pavel Shilovsky <email address hidden>
(cherry picked from commit c42a6abe3012832a68a371dabe17c2ced97e62ad)
Acked-by: Brad Figg <email address hidden>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Henrique Cerri <email address hidden>