Merge ~ubuntu-core-dev/shim/+git/shim-signed:xnox/dual-signed into ~ubuntu-core-dev/shim/+git/shim:master

[Dimitri John Ledkov]

Construct and ship dual-signed shim.

Currently using shim-canonical provided signed artefacts.

Unmerged commits

8ba0dc3... by Dimitri John Ledkov on 2020-08-04

Construct and ship dual-signed shim.

b384346... by Dimitri John Ledkov on 2020-06-22

Construct and ship dual-signed shim.

2786832... by Dimitri John Ledkov on 2020-06-22

Add download-signed script from linux-signed package

972530c... by Julian Andres Klode on 2020-08-03

releasing package shim-signed version 1.42

19b9216... by Julian Andres Klode on 2020-08-03

Update to the signed 15+1552672080.a4a1fbe-0ubuntu2 binary from Microsoft.

68eae8b... by Steve Langasek on 2020-02-05

releasing package shim-signed version 1.41

de258c9... by Steve Langasek on 2019-12-15

releasing package shim-signed version 1.40

716983a... by Steve Langasek on 2019-12-15

Add a versioned dependency on the mokutil that introduces --timeout.

fba9ff6... by Steve Langasek on 2019-12-15

Pass --timeout -1 to mokutil so that users don't end up with broken systems by missing MokManager on reboot after install. LP: #1856422.

54a591e... by dann frazier on 2018-11-14

releasing package shim-signed version 1.39

diff --git a/CanonicalMasterCA.crt b/CanonicalMasterCA.crt
 new file mode 100644
index 0000000..55c06d5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/CanonicalMasterCA.crt
@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
diff --git a/Makefile b/Makefile
index 49e14a2..80f7885 100644
--- a/Makefile
+++ b/Makefile
@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
+<<<<<<< Makefile
 default : all
 
 NAME		= shim
@@ -263,3 +264,41 @@ archive: tag
 .PHONY : install-deps shim.key
 
 export ARCH CC LD OBJCOPY EFI_INCLUDE
+=======
+SHIM_CANONICAL_VERSION=$(shell dpkg-query -W -f'$${Version}' shim-canonical-unsigned)
+
+check:
+	mkdir -p build
+	# Verifying that the image is signed with the correct key.
+	#sbverify --cert cyphermox.crt shimx64.efi.signed
+	sbverify --cert MicCorUEFCA2011_2011-06-27.crt $(SHIM_BASE).signed
+	# Verifying that we have the correct binary.
+	sbattach --detach build/detached-sig $(SHIM_BASE).signed 
+	cp /usr/lib/shim/$(SHIM_BASE) build/$(SHIM_BASE).signed
+	sbattach --attach build/detached-sig build/$(SHIM_BASE).signed
+	cmp $(SHIM_BASE).signed build/$(SHIM_BASE).signed
+	####
+	# Construct dual-signed shim
+	./download-signed shim-canonical-unsigned $(SHIM_CANONICAL_VERSION) shim-canonical signed
+	# Verify that the downloaded binary has signatures chained to Canonical Master CA
+	sbverify --cert CanonicalMasterCA.crt $(SHIM_CANONICAL_VERSION)/$(SHIM_BASE).signed
+	# Detach Canonical signature
+	sbattach --detach $(SHIM_CANONICAL_VERSION)/detached-sig-canonical $(SHIM_CANONICAL_VERSION)/$(SHIM_BASE).signed
+	rm $(SHIM_CANONICAL_VERSION)/$(SHIM_BASE).signed
+	# Compare that shims are all the same now
+	cmp /usr/lib/shim/$(SHIM_BASE) $(SHIM_CANONICAL_VERSION)/$(SHIM_BASE)
+	# Reattach Canonical signature
+	sbattach --attach $(SHIM_CANONICAL_VERSION)/detached-sig-canonical $(SHIM_CANONICAL_VERSION)/$(SHIM_BASE)
+	# Verify that attachment worked
+	sbverify --cert CanonicalMasterCA.crt $(SHIM_CANONICAL_VERSION)/$(SHIM_BASE)
+	# Attach Microsoft signature
+	sbattach --attach build/detached-sig $(SHIM_CANONICAL_VERSION)/$(SHIM_BASE)
+	# Validate that this shim is now dualsigned
+	sbverify --list $(SHIM_CANONICAL_VERSION)/$(SHIM_BASE)
+	sbverify --cert CanonicalMasterCA.crt $(SHIM_CANONICAL_VERSION)/$(SHIM_BASE)
+	sbverify --cert MicCorUEFCA2011_2011-06-27.crt $(SHIM_CANONICAL_VERSION)/$(SHIM_BASE)
+	cp $(SHIM_CANONICAL_VERSION)/$(SHIM_BASE) build/$(SHIM_BASE).dualsigned
+
+clean:
+	rm -rf build $(SHIM_CANONICAL_VERSION) $shim_boot.csv BOOT$(EFI_ARCH).CSV
+>>>>>>> Makefile
diff --git a/MicCorUEFCA2011_2011-06-27.crt b/MicCorUEFCA2011_2011-06-27.crt
 new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d7c29ef
--- /dev/null
+++ b/MicCorUEFCA2011_2011-06-27.crt
@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
diff --git a/debian/bzr-builddeb.conf b/debian/bzr-builddeb.conf
 new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3a08d60
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/bzr-builddeb.conf
@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+[BUILDDEB]
+native = True
diff --git a/debian/changelog b/debian/changelog
index 1e18261..6f2af53 100644
--- a/debian/changelog
+++ b/debian/changelog
@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
+<<<<<<< debian/changelog
 shim (15+1552672080.a4a1fbe-0ubuntu2) focal; urgency=medium
 
   * d/patches/fix-path-checks.patch: Cherry-pick upstream fix for regression
@@ -303,3 +304,426 @@ shim (0~20120906.bcd0a4e8-0ubuntu1) quantal; urgency=low
   * Include the Canonical Secure Boot master CA.
 
  -- Steve Langasek <[e-mail]>  Thu, 04 Oct 2012 00:01:06 -0700
+=======
+shim-signed (1.43) UNRELEASED; urgency=medium
+
+  * Add download-signed script from linux-signed package
+  * Construct and ship dual-signed shim.
+
+ -- Dimitri John Ledkov <[e-mail]>  Tue, 04 Aug 2020 14:23:29 +0100
+
+shim-signed (1.42) groovy; urgency=medium
+
+  * Update to the signed 15+1552672080.a4a1fbe-0ubuntu2 binary from Microsoft.
+
+ -- Julian Andres Klode <[e-mail]>  Mon, 03 Aug 2020 12:36:10 +0200
+
+shim-signed (1.41) focal; urgency=medium
+
+  * Update to the signed 15+1552672080.a4a1fbe-0ubuntu1 binary from Microsoft.
+
+ -- Steve Langasek <[e-mail]>  Wed, 05 Feb 2020 13:04:08 -0800
+
+shim-signed (1.40) focal; urgency=medium
+
+  * Pass --timeout -1 to mokutil so that users don't end up with broken
+    systems by missing MokManager on reboot after install.  LP: #1856422.
+  * Add a versioned dependency on the mokutil that introduces --timeout.
+
+ -- Steve Langasek <[e-mail]>  Sat, 14 Dec 2019 20:26:42 -0800
+
+shim-signed (1.39) disco; urgency=medium
+
+  * debian/source_shim-signed.py: Correct EFI architecture name for arm64.
+  * Parameterize code to remove hardcoded x86-isms.
+  * Add arm64 support.
+
+ -- dann frazier <[e-mail]>  Wed, 14 Nov 2018 11:13:42 -0700
+
+shim-signed (1.38) cosmic; urgency=medium
+
+  * Don't fail non-interactive upgrade of nvidia module and module removals
+    (LP: #1726803)
+
+ -- Balint Reczey <[e-mail]>  Thu, 11 Oct 2018 18:12:37 +0200
+
+shim-signed (1.37) cosmic; urgency=medium
+
+  * Update to the signed 15+1533136590.3beb971-0ubuntu1 binary from Microsoft.
+  * debian/real-po: replace debian/po to make sure things are translatable
+    via Launchpad.
+
+ -- Mathieu Trudel-Lapierre <[e-mail]>  Wed, 29 Aug 2018 15:43:41 -0400
+
+shim-signed (1.36) cosmic; urgency=medium
+
+  * debian/shim-signed.postinst: use --auto-nvram with grub-install in case
+    we're installing on a NVRAM-unavailable platform.
+  * debian/control: bump the dependency for grub2-common to make sure
+    grub-install supports --auto-nvram.
+  * debian/control: switch the grub-efi-amd64-bin dependency to
+    grub-efi-amd64-signed.
+
+ -- Łukasz 'sil2100' Zemczak <[e-mail]>  Wed, 06 Jun 2018 20:25:57 +0200
+
+shim-signed (1.35) cosmic; urgency=medium
+
+  * update-secureboot-policy: fix quoting for key/again password handling to
+    mokutil. (LP: #1770579)
+  * update-secureboot-policy: don't allow backtracking at the "main" question
+    for whether to enroll a new MOK. (LP: #1767091)
+
+ -- Mathieu Trudel-Lapierre <[e-mail]>  Thu, 31 May 2018 17:46:46 -0400
+
+shim-signed (1.34.9) bionic; urgency=medium
+
+  * debian/shim-signed.postinst: check for MOK existence rather than ignoring
+    failures in the trigger. (LP: #1766627)
+
+ -- Mathieu Trudel-Lapierre <[e-mail]>  Tue, 24 Apr 2018 13:24:24 -0400
+
+shim-signed (1.34.8) bionic; urgency=medium
+
+  * debian/shim-signed.postinst: shim-signed's trigger to enroll a new MOK
+    should not fail the upgrade if there was no MOK to enroll. (LP: #1766627)
+
+ -- Mathieu Trudel-Lapierre <[e-mail]>  Tue, 24 Apr 2018 12:31:25 -0400
+
+shim-signed (1.34.7) bionic; urgency=medium
+
+  * debian/shim-signed.postinst: it's not guaranteed that all linux-image
+    packages currently installed have dkms modules built for them.
+    Gracefully handle any failures in the path for signing existing dkms
+    modules on upgrade due to absent modules.  LP: #1766391.
+  * Add a dependency on sbsigntool for kmodsign, which we use directly.
+
+ -- Steve Langasek <[e-mail]>  Mon, 23 Apr 2018 21:47:50 -0700
+
+shim-signed (1.34.6) bionic; urgency=medium
+
+  * debian/shim-signed.postinst: bump lower version for batch-signing module
+    to 1.34.6, to make sure everything is properly signed if people got one
+    of the previous shim-signed packages.
+
+ -- Mathieu Trudel-Lapierre <[e-mail]>  Mon, 23 Apr 2018 19:52:19 -0400
+
+shim-signed (1.34.5) bionic; urgency=medium
+
+  * Don't try to save new dkms list if we're still dealing with password
+    validation for enrollment. (LP: #1766312)
+  * Specify kernel version when installing/uninstalling modules while doing
+    batch signing on upgrade.
+  * Do a better job at finding kernel modules from DKMS if they are in sub-
+    directories.
+  * Don't prompt if DKMS is installed but there are no DKMS-built modules
+    installed. (LP: #1766261)
+
+ -- Mathieu Trudel-Lapierre <[e-mail]>  Mon, 23 Apr 2018 15:29:44 -0400
+
+shim-signed (1.34.4) bionic; urgency=medium
+
+  * Handle the case that there are no kernel modules available for a given
+    dkms package.  This probably indicates there is a problem with the dkms
+    module's installation, but that should not cause this package's
+    installation to fail.  LP: #1765954.
+
+ -- Steve Langasek <[e-mail]>  Sat, 21 Apr 2018 10:13:41 -0700
+
+shim-signed (1.34.3) bionic; urgency=medium
+
+  * Only take the first 31 bytes of the hostname.  LP: #1765905.
+
+ -- Steve Langasek <[e-mail]>  Sat, 21 Apr 2018 01:14:12 -0700
+
+shim-signed (1.34.2) bionic; urgency=medium
+
+  * Handle the case of multiple .kos per dkms module and .kos whose name
+    does not match the dkms package name.  LP: #1765647.
+
+ -- Steve Langasek <[e-mail]>  Sat, 21 Apr 2018 01:01:56 -0700
+
+shim-signed (1.34.1) bionic; urgency=medium
+
+  * update-secureboot-policy: don't skip creating a MOK if Secure Boot is not
+    enabled in firmware, but do guard against prompting users on a system that
+    doesn't have efivars mounted or where SB is disabled. (LP: #1765515)
+
+ -- Mathieu Trudel-Lapierre <[e-mail]>  Thu, 19 Apr 2018 17:56:50 -0400
+
+shim-signed (1.34) bionic; urgency=medium
+
+  * update-secureboot-policy: (LP: #1748983)
+    - Factor out validate_password() and clear_passwords() for reuse.
+    - Add --new-key option to generate a self-signed MOK.
+    - Add --enroll-key option to allow enrolling a new MOK in shim.
+    - Drop --enable and --disable options; users should call mokutil directly
+      instead.
+  * debian/shim-signed.postinst:
+    - When triggered, explicitly try to enroll the available MOK.
+  * debian/shim-signed.install, openssl.cnf: Install some default configuration
+    for creating our self-signed key.
+  * debian/shim-signed.dirs: make sure we have a directory where to put a MOK.
+  * debian/templates: update templates for update-secureboot-policy changes.
+  * debian/control: add versioned Breaks: for dkms.
+
+ -- Mathieu Trudel-Lapierre <[e-mail]>  Wed, 18 Apr 2018 22:35:46 -0400
+
+shim-signed (1.33.1) bionic; urgency=medium
+
+  * Update to the signed 13-0ubuntu2 binary from Microsoft. (LP: #1708245)
+  * Stop generating and install BOOT.CSV, shim will do that by itself now.
+  * Add Vcs-* fields.
+
+ -- Mathieu Trudel-Lapierre <[e-mail]>  Thu, 21 Dec 2017 14:33:37 -0500
+
+shim-signed (1.32) artful; urgency=medium
+
+  * Handle cleanup of /var/lib/shim-signed on package purge.
+
+ -- Steve Langasek <[e-mail]>  Fri, 23 Jun 2017 22:30:42 -0700
+
+shim-signed (1.31) artful; urgency=medium
+
+  * Fix regression in postinst when /var/lib/dkms does not exist.
+    LP: #1700195.
+  * Sort the list of dkms modules when recording.
+
+ -- Steve Langasek <[e-mail]>  Fri, 23 Jun 2017 22:13:40 -0700
+
+shim-signed (1.30) artful; urgency=medium
+
+  * update-secureboot-policy: track the installed DKMS modules so we can skip
+    failing unattended upgrades if they hasn't changed (ie. if no new DKMS
+    modules have been installed, just honour the user's previous decision to
+    not disable shim validation). (LP: #1695578)
+  * update-secureboot-policy: allow re-enabling shim validation when no DKMS
+    packages are installed. (LP: #1673904)
+  * debian/source_shim-signed.py: add the textual representation of SecureBoot
+    and MokSBStateRT EFI variables rather than just adding the files directly;
+    also, make sure we include the relevant EFI bits from kernel log.
+    (LP: #1680279)
+
+ -- Mathieu Trudel-Lapierre <[e-mail]>  Fri, 23 Jun 2017 14:37:21 -0400
+
+shim-signed (1.29) artful; urgency=medium
+
+  * Makefile: Generate BOOT$arch.CSV, for use with fallback.
+  * debian/rules: make sure we can do per-arch EFI files.
+
+ -- Mathieu Trudel-Lapierre <[e-mail]>  Wed, 26 Apr 2017 21:36:57 -0400
+
+shim-signed (1.28) zesty; urgency=medium
+
+  * Adjust apport hook to include key files that tell us about the system's
+    current SB state.
+
+ -- Steve Langasek <[e-mail]>  Wed, 05 Apr 2017 15:14:49 -0700
+
+shim-signed (1.27) zesty; urgency=medium
+
+  [ Steve Langasek ]
+  * Update to the signed 0.9+1474479173.6c180c6-1ubuntu1 binary from
+    Microsoft.
+  * update-secureboot-policy:
+    - detect when we have no debconf prompting and error out instead of ending
+      up in an infinite loop.  LP: #1673817.
+    - refactor to make the code easier to follow.
+    - remove a confusing boolean that would always re-prompt on a request to
+      --enable, but not on a request to --disable.
+
+  [ Mathieu Trudel-Lapierre ]
+  * update-secureboot-policy:
+    - some more fixes to properly handle non-interactive mode. (LP: #1673817)
+
+ -- Mathieu Trudel-Lapierre <[e-mail]>  Tue, 21 Mar 2017 14:28:46 -0400
+
+shim-signed (1.23) zesty; urgency=medium
+
+  * debian/control: bump the Depends on grub2-common since that's needed to
+    install with the new updated EFI binaries filenames.
+
+ -- Mathieu Trudel-Lapierre <[e-mail]>  Fri, 21 Oct 2016 13:31:05 -0400
+
+shim-signed (1.22) yakkety; urgency=medium
+
+  * Update to the signed 0.9+1474479173.6c180c6-0ubuntu1 binary from Microsoft.
+  * Update paths now that the shim binary has been renamed to include the
+    target architecture.
+  * debian/shim-signed.postinst: clean up old MokManager.efi from EFI/ubuntu;
+    since it's being replaced by mm$arch.efi.
+
+ -- Mathieu Trudel-Lapierre <[e-mail]>  Thu, 13 Oct 2016 13:49:17 -0400
+
+shim-signed (1.21.3) vivid; urgency=medium
+
+  * No-change rebuild for shim 0.9+1465500757.14a5905.is.0.8-0ubuntu3.
+
+ -- Mathieu Trudel-Lapierre <[e-mail]>  Thu, 06 Oct 2016 19:20:36 -0400
+
+shim-signed (1.21.2) vivid; urgency=medium
+
+  * Revert to signed shim from 0.8-0ubuntu2. (LP: #1624096)
+    - shim.efi.signed originally built from shim 0.8-0ubuntu2 in wily. 
+
+ -- Mathieu Trudel-Lapierre <[e-mail]>  Mon, 03 Oct 2016 17:17:54 -0400
+
+shim-signed (1.20) yakkety; urgency=medium
+
+  * Update to the signed 0.9+1465500757.14a5905-0ubuntu1 binary from Microsoft.
+    (LP: #1581299)
+
+ -- Mathieu Trudel-Lapierre <[e-mail]>  Mon, 08 Aug 2016 11:14:21 -0400
+
+shim-signed (1.19) yakkety; urgency=medium
+
+  * update-secureboot-policy:
+    - Add a --help option, document other options. (LP: #1604936)
+    - Rework prompting to display our Secure Boot warning and explanation
+      text more prominently, rather than forcing graphical users to hit
+      "Help" to see the full explanation for why we ask about disabling
+      Secure Boot. (LP: #1595611)
+
+ -- Mathieu Trudel-Lapierre <[e-mail]>  Tue, 02 Aug 2016 11:01:50 -0400
+
+shim-signed (1.18) yakkety; urgency=medium
+
+  * update-secureboot-policy:  If /proc/sys/kernel/moksbstate_disabled is
+    present, prefer this unconditionally over MokSBStateRT.  LP: #1604873.
+
+ -- Steve Langasek <[e-mail]>  Wed, 20 Jul 2016 08:31:17 -0700
+
+shim-signed (1.17) yakkety; urgency=medium
+
+  * update-secureboot-policy: rework setting capabilities to stop having
+    the backup capability while showing an error message; which won't affect
+    the Dialog debconf frontend but otherwise made the GTK frontend confusing.
+  * update-secureboot-policy: all debconf prompts should be at priority
+    critical: there is no good default to pick, we must prompt the user.
+  * debian/templates: make the password inputs be standard inputs; this is an
+    unfortunate workaround to aptdaemon not having access to the debconf
+    password database on desktop; since the frontend runs as an unprivileged
+    user. See bug LP#1599981 (LP: #1599051)
+
+ -- Mathieu Trudel-Lapierre <[e-mail]>  Thu, 07 Jul 2016 16:58:45 -0400
+
+shim-signed (1.16) yakkety; urgency=medium
+
+  * debian/shim-signed.postinst: call for the trigger on update of shim-signed.
+
+ -- Mathieu Trudel-Lapierre <[e-mail]>  Tue, 28 Jun 2016 17:34:23 -0400
+
+shim-signed (1.15) yakkety; urgency=medium
+
+  * update-secureboot-policy: validate the state of MokSBStateRT against what
+    the kernel believes it to be via /proc/sys/kernel/moksbstate_disabled,
+    in case we have the kernel which knows about shim's validation policy but
+    an old shim that doesn't export MokSBStateRT.
+
+ -- Mathieu Trudel-Lapierre <[e-mail]>  Fri, 17 Jun 2016 16:47:40 +0300
+
+shim-signed (1.14) yakkety; urgency=medium
+
+  * update-secureboot-policy:
+    - Make it easier for users to really re-enable Secure Boot via an --enable
+      option.
+    - Don't prompt for action if there are no DKMS packages installed, as per
+      checking if there are any subdirectories in /var/lib/dkms.
+
+ -- Mathieu Trudel-Lapierre <[e-mail]>  Tue, 07 Jun 2016 16:09:53 -0400
+
+shim-signed (1.13) yakkety; urgency=medium
+
+  * update-secureboot-policy: have a trigger-ready script available to deal
+    with the necessity to change Secure Boot policy on a system.
+  * debian/shim-signed.templates: ship the necessary templates for secureboot.
+  * debian/shim-signed.postinst: Run our trigger script to update Secure Boot
+    policy when necessary at the end of installs, without calling dpkg-trigger
+    again.
+
+ -- Mathieu Trudel-Lapierre <[e-mail]>  Mon, 16 May 2016 15:29:27 -0400
+
+shim-signed (1.12) xenial; urgency=medium
+
+  * debian/control: add Depends on mokutil, to ship a way for users to
+    control shim features, such as enrolling new keys.
+
+ -- Mathieu Trudel-Lapierre <[e-mail]>  Wed, 16 Dec 2015 10:19:23 -0500
+
+shim-signed (1.11) wily; urgency=medium
+
+  * Add in an apport package hook for shim-signed and shim. (LP: #1490030)
+
+ -- Brian Murray <[e-mail]>  Fri, 11 Sep 2015 15:04:31 -0700
+
+shim-signed (1.10) wily; urgency=medium
+
+  * Add a versioned dependency on grub2-common, so that partial upgrades from
+    Ubuntu 12.04 don't break due to a lack of --target option to grub-install.
+    LP: #1474203.
+
+ -- Steve Langasek <[e-mail]>  Tue, 14 Jul 2015 10:46:41 -0700
+
+shim-signed (1.9) wily; urgency=medium
+
+  * Update to the signed 0.8-0ubuntu2 binary from Microsoft.
+
+ -- Steve Langasek <[e-mail]>  Sun, 07 Jun 2015 19:27:35 +0000
+
+shim-signed (1.8) utopic; urgency=medium
+
+  * Update to the signed 0.7-0ubuntu4 binary from Microsoft.
+
+ -- Steve Langasek <[e-mail]>  Tue, 21 Oct 2014 18:23:15 -0400
+
+shim-signed (1.6) trusty; urgency=low
+
+  * Also add a build-dependency on grub2-common, to ensure that our
+    grub-install is the correct one - since grub-efi-amd64-bin is
+    coinstallable with grub1.  LP: #1259558.
+
+ -- Steve Langasek <[e-mail]>  Tue, 10 Dec 2013 09:10:23 -0800
+
+shim-signed (1.5) trusty; urgency=low
+
+  * Pass --target=x86_64-efi to grub-install from the postinst and depend on
+    grub-efi-amd64-bin, so that package upgrades will do the right thing
+    even if the system has been rebooted under BIOS.  LP: #1246910.
+  * Kubuntu sets GRUB_DISTRIBUTOR to a different value which doesn't match
+    the path under /boot/efi; fix this up so shim-signed upgrades properly
+    on Kubuntu systems.  LP: #1242417.
+
+ -- Steve Langasek <[e-mail]>  Thu, 31 Oct 2013 17:06:21 -0700
+
+shim-signed (1.4) trusty; urgency=low
+
+  * Add a dependency on shim, so that we can pull in MokManager for use.    
+  * Update to the signed 0.4-0ubuntu4 binary from Microsoft.
+
+ -- Steve Langasek <[e-mail]>  Wed, 30 Oct 2013 15:04:23 -0700
+
+shim-signed (1.3) saucy; urgency=low
+
+  * Build-depend on sbsigntool (>= 0.6-0ubuntu4) and check the integrity of
+    our signed binary at build time.
+  * Update to the signed 0.4-0ubuntu3 binary from Microsoft.
+
+ -- Steve Langasek <[e-mail]>  Sat, 07 Sep 2013 22:09:22 +0000
+
+shim-signed (1.2) raring; urgency=low
+
+  * Recommend secureboot-db (LP: #1087843).
+
+ -- Colin Watson <[e-mail]>  Sat, 16 Feb 2013 00:02:00 +0000
+
+shim-signed (1.1) quantal-proposed; urgency=low
+
+  * Rev shim-signed for updated shim.
+
+ -- Steve Langasek <[e-mail]>  Fri, 12 Oct 2012 01:42:07 +0000
+
+shim-signed (1.0) quantal; urgency=low
+
+  * Initial release, based on grub2-signed package.
+
+ -- Steve Langasek <[e-mail]>  Tue, 09 Oct 2012 15:48:37 -0700
+>>>>>>> debian/changelog
diff --git a/debian/control b/debian/control
index c8b8ffa..d30cce8 100644
--- a/debian/control
+++ b/debian/control
@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
+<<<<<<< debian/control
 Source: shim
 Section: admin
 Priority: optional
@@ -12,8 +13,31 @@ Architecture: amd64 arm64
 Depends: ${shlibs:Depends}, ${misc:Depends}
 Breaks: shim-signed (<< 1.33~)
 Description: boot loader to chain-load signed boot loaders under Secure Boot
+=======
+Source: shim-signed
+Section: utils
+Priority: optional
+Maintainer: Steve Langasek <[e-mail]>
+Build-Depends: debhelper (>= 9), dh-exec, shim, sbsigntool (>= 0.6-0ubuntu4), po-debconf
+Standards-Version: 3.9.4
+Vcs-Git: https://git.launchpad.net/~ubuntu-core-dev/shim/+git/shim-signed
+Vcs-Browser: https://git.launchpad.net/~ubuntu-core-dev/shim/+git/shim-signed
+
+Package: shim-signed
+Architecture: amd64 arm64
+Depends: ${misc:Depends}, shim (= ${shim:Version}), grub-efi-amd64-signed | grub-efi-arm64-signed, grub2-common (>= 2.02-2ubuntu9), mokutil (>= 0.3.0+1538710437.fb6250f-0ubuntu2), sbsigntool
+Recommends: secureboot-db
+Built-Using: shim (= ${shim:Version})
+Description: Secure Boot chain-loading bootloader (Microsoft-signed binary)
+>>>>>>> debian/control
  This package provides a minimalist boot loader which allows verifying
  signatures of other UEFI binaries against either the Secure Boot DB/DBX or
  against a built-in signature database.  Its purpose is to allow a small,
  infrequently-changing binary to be signed by the UEFI CA, while allowing
  an OS distributor to revision their main bootloader independently of the CA.
+<<<<<<< debian/control
+=======
+ .
+ This package contains the version of the bootloader binary signed by the
+ Microsoft UEFI CA.
+>>>>>>> debian/control
diff --git a/debian/copyright b/debian/copyright
index 64b3f57..1debf7d 100644
--- a/debian/copyright
+++ b/debian/copyright
@@ -1,5 +1,6 @@
 Format: http://www.debian.org/doc/packaging-manuals/copyright-format/1.0/
 Upstream-Name: shim
+<<<<<<< debian/copyright
 Upstream-Contact: Matthew Garrett <[e-mail]>
 Source: https://github.com/rhboot/shim
 
@@ -227,6 +228,14 @@ License: BSD-3-Clause-Intel
  NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS
  SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
 
+=======
+Upstream-Contact: Matthew Garrett <[e-mail]>
+Source: https://github.com/mjg59/shim.git
+
+Files: *
+Copyright: 2012 Red Hat, Inc
+	2009-2012 Intel Corporation
+>>>>>>> debian/copyright
 License: BSD-2-Clause
  Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
  modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
diff --git a/debian/lintian-overrides b/debian/lintian-overrides
 new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5ce68fc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/lintian-overrides
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+shim-signed: debconf-is-not-a-registry usr/sbin/update-secureboot-policy
diff --git a/debian/po b/debian/po
 new file mode 120000
index 0000000..081d461
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/po
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+real-po
 \ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/debian/real-po/POTFILES.in b/debian/real-po/POTFILES.in
 new file mode 100644
index 0000000..cef83a3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/real-po/POTFILES.in
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+[type: gettext/rfc822deb] templates
diff --git a/debian/real-po/templates.pot b/debian/real-po/templates.pot
 new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5cbebf0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/real-po/templates.pot
@@ -0,0 +1,110 @@
+# SOME DESCRIPTIVE TITLE.
+# Copyright (C) YEAR THE PACKAGE'S COPYRIGHT HOLDER
+# This file is distributed under the same license as the shim-signed package.
+# FIRST AUTHOR <EMAIL@ADDRESS>, YEAR.
+#
+#, fuzzy
+msgid ""
+msgstr ""
+"Project-Id-Version: shim-signed\n"
+"Report-Msgid-Bugs-To: [e-mail]\n"
+"POT-Creation-Date: 2016-05-04 16:57-0500\n"
+"PO-Revision-Date: YEAR-MO-DA HO:MI+ZONE\n"
+"Last-Translator: FULL NAME <EMAIL@ADDRESS>\n"
+"Language-Team: LANGUAGE <[e-mail]>\n"
+"Language: \n"
+"MIME-Version: 1.0\n"
+"Content-Type: text/plain; charset=CHARSET\n"
+"Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit\n"
+
+#. Type: text
+#. Description
+#: ../templates:1001
+msgid "Configuring Secure Boot"
+msgstr ""
+
+#. Type: error
+#. Description
+#: ../templates:2001
+msgid "Invalid password"
+msgstr ""
+
+#. Type: error
+#. Description
+#: ../templates:2001
+msgid ""
+"The Secure Boot key you've entered is not valid. The password used must be "
+"between 8 and 16 characters."
+msgstr ""
+
+#. Type: boolean
+#. Description
+#: ../templates:3001
+msgid "Disable UEFI Secure Boot?"
+msgstr ""
+
+#. Type: boolean
+#. Description
+#: ../templates:3001
+msgid ""
+"Your system has UEFI Secure Boot enabled. UEFI Secure Boot is not compatible "
+"with the use of third-party drivers."
+msgstr ""
+
+#. Type: boolean
+#. Description
+#: ../templates:3001
+msgid ""
+"The system will assist you in disabling UEFI Secure Boot. To ensure that "
+"this change is being made by you as an authorized user, and not by an "
+"attacker, you must choose a password now and then use the same password "
+"after reboot to confirm the change."
+msgstr ""
+
+#. Type: boolean
+#. Description
+#: ../templates:3001
+msgid ""
+"If you choose to proceed but do not confirm the password upon reboot, Ubuntu "
+"will still be able to boot on your system but these third-party drivers will "
+"not be available for your hardware."
+msgstr ""
+
+#. Type: password
+#. Description
+#: ../templates:4001
+msgid "Password:"
+msgstr ""
+
+#. Type: password
+#. Description
+#: ../templates:4001
+msgid ""
+"Please enter a password for disabling Secure Boot. It will be asked again "
+"after a reboot."
+msgstr ""
+
+#. Type: password
+#. Description
+#: ../templates:5001
+msgid "Re-enter password to verify:"
+msgstr ""
+
+#. Type: password
+#. Description
+#: ../templates:5001
+msgid ""
+"Please enter the same password again to verify you have typed it correctly."
+msgstr ""
+
+#. Type: error
+#. Description
+#: ../templates:6001
+msgid "Password input error"
+msgstr ""
+
+#. Type: error
+#. Description
+#: ../templates:6001
+msgid "The two passwords you entered were not the same. Please try again."
+msgstr ""
diff --git a/debian/rules b/debian/rules
index aa94e7c..c8a6f99 100755
--- a/debian/rules
+++ b/debian/rules
@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
+<<<<<<< debian/rules
 #!/usr/bin/make -f
 
 # Other vendors, add your certs here.  No sense in using
@@ -46,3 +47,32 @@ override_dh_auto_install:
 override_dh_fixperms:
 	dh_fixperms
 	chmod a-x debian/shim/usr/lib/shim/shim$(EFI_ARCH).efi
+=======
+#! /usr/bin/make -f
+
+VERSION := $(shell LC_ALL=C dpkg-parsechangelog | grep ^Version: | cut -d ' ' -f 2)
+SHIM_VERSION := $(shell dpkg-query -f '$${Version}\n' -W shim)
+
+ifeq ($(DEB_TARGET_ARCH),amd64)
+export EFI_ARCH := X64
+endif
+ifeq ($(DEB_TARGET_ARCH),arm64)
+export EFI_ARCH := AA64
+endif
+export SHIM_BASE = shim$(shell echo $(EFI_ARCH) | tr A-Z a-z).efi
+
+%:
+	dh $@
+
+docdir := debian/shim-signed/usr/share/doc/shim-signed
+
+override_dh_installchangelogs:
+	dh_installchangelogs
+	# Quieten lintian, which otherwise gets confused by our odd version
+	# number.
+	ln $(docdir)/changelog $(docdir)/changelog.Debian
+
+override_dh_gencontrol:
+	dh_gencontrol -- -v$(VERSION)+$(SHIM_VERSION) \
+		-Vshim:Version=$(SHIM_VERSION)
+>>>>>>> debian/rules
diff --git a/debian/shim-signed.dirs b/debian/shim-signed.dirs
 new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7e25a1f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/shim-signed.dirs
@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+var/lib/shim-signed
+var/lib/shim-signed/mok
diff --git a/debian/shim-signed.install b/debian/shim-signed.install
 new file mode 100755
index 0000000..93d4e26
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/shim-signed.install
@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
+#! /usr/bin/dh-exec
+
+${SHIM_BASE}.signed /usr/lib/shim
+build/${SHIM_BASE}.dualsigned /usr/lib/shim
+openssl.cnf /usr/lib/shim/mok
+debian/source_shim-signed.py /usr/share/apport/package-hooks/
+update-secureboot-policy /usr/sbin/
diff --git a/debian/shim-signed.links b/debian/shim-signed.links
 new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2e3ccf9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/shim-signed.links
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+usr/share/apport/package-hooks/source_shim-signed.py usr/share/apport/package-hooks/source_shim.py
diff --git a/debian/shim-signed.postinst b/debian/shim-signed.postinst
 new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d554f89
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/shim-signed.postinst
@@ -0,0 +1,100 @@
+#! /bin/sh
+set -e
+
+# Must load the confmodule for our template to be installed correctly.
+. /usr/share/debconf/confmodule
+
+config_item ()
+{
+    if [ -f /etc/default/grub ]; then
+	. /etc/default/grub || return
+	for x in /etc/default/grub.d/*.cfg; do
+	    if [ -e "$x" ]; then
+		. "$x"
+	    fi
+	done
+    fi
+    eval echo "\$$1"
+}
+
+sign_dkms_modules()
+{
+	for kern in `dpkg -l linux-image-[0-9]\* | awk '/^ii/ { sub("linux-image-","",$2); print $2 }'`;
+	do
+		for dkms in `dkms status -k $(uname -r) | grep 'installed' | awk -F,\  '{print $1"/"$2}'`;
+		do
+			dkms uninstall -k "$kern" "$dkms" || :
+			if ! dkms status -k "$kern" "$dkms" | grep -q 'built$'
+			then
+				cat <<EOF
+
+shim-signed: failed to prepare dkms module for signing; ignoring.
+  module: $dkms
+  kernel: $kern
+EOF
+				continue
+			fi
+			mods=$(find /var/lib/dkms/${dkms}/${kern}/$(uname -m)/module/ -name "*.ko")
+			for mod in $mods; do
+				kmodsign sha512 \
+					/var/lib/shim-signed/mok/MOK.priv \
+					/var/lib/shim-signed/mok/MOK.der \
+					$mod
+			done
+			dkms install -k "$kern" "${dkms}"
+		done
+	done
+}
+
+case $(dpkg --print-architecture) in
+    amd64)
+	grubarch=x86_64-efi
+	;;
+    arm64)
+	grubarch=arm64-efi
+	;;
+esac
+case $1 in
+    triggered)
+	if [ -e /var/lib/shim-signed/mok/MOK.priv ]; then
+	    SHIM_NOTRIGGER=y update-secureboot-policy --enroll-key
+	fi
+	;;
+    configure)
+	bootloader_id="$(config_item GRUB_DISTRIBUTOR | tr A-Z a-z | \
+			 cut -d' ' -f1)"
+	case $bootloader_id in
+	    kubuntu) bootloader_id=ubuntu ;;
+	esac
+	if [ "$bootloader_id" ] && [ -d "/boot/efi/EFI/$bootloader_id" ] \
+	   && which grub-install >/dev/null 2>&1
+	then
+	    grub-install --target=${grubarch} --auto-nvram
+            if dpkg --compare-versions "$2" lt-nl "1.22~"; then
+                rm -f /boot/efi/EFI/ubuntu/MokManager.efi
+            fi
+	fi
+
+	# Upgrade case, capture pre-existing DKMS packages.
+	if dpkg --compare-versions "$2" lt-nl "1.30" \
+	   && [ -d /var/lib/dkms ]
+	then
+		find /var/lib/dkms -maxdepth 1 -type d -print \
+		| LC_ALL=C sort	> /var/lib/shim-signed/dkms-list
+	fi
+
+	# Upgrade case, migrate all existing kernels/dkms module combinations
+	# to self-signed modules.
+	if dpkg --compare-versions "$2" lt "1.34.7" \
+	   && [ -d /var/lib/dkms ]
+	then
+		SHIM_NOTRIGGER=y update-secureboot-policy --new-key
+		sign_dkms_modules
+		SHIM_NOTRIGGER=y update-secureboot-policy --enroll-key
+	fi
+	;;
+esac
+
+#DEBHELPER#
+
+exit 0
diff --git a/debian/shim-signed.postrm b/debian/shim-signed.postrm
 new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4933982
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/shim-signed.postrm
@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+#!/bin/sh
+set -e
+
+case $1 in
+	purge)
+		rm -rf /var/lib/shim-signed
+		;;
+esac
+
+#DEBHELPER#
diff --git a/debian/shim-signed.triggers b/debian/shim-signed.triggers
 new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2b33128
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/shim-signed.triggers
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+interest-noawait shim-secureboot-policy
diff --git a/debian/source/format b/debian/source/format
index 163aaf8..74559ab 100644
--- a/debian/source/format
+++ b/debian/source/format
@@ -1 +1,5 @@
+<<<<<<< debian/source/format
 3.0 (quilt)
+=======
+3.0 (native)
+>>>>>>> debian/source/format
diff --git a/debian/source_shim-signed.py b/debian/source_shim-signed.py
 new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6df7f28
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/source_shim-signed.py
@@ -0,0 +1,58 @@
+'''apport package hook for shim and shim-signed
+
+(c) 2015 Canonical Ltd.
+Author: Brian Murray <[e-mail]>
+'''
+
+import errno
+import os
+import re
+
+from apport.hookutils import (
+    command_available,
+    command_output,
+    recent_syslog,
+    attach_file,
+    attach_root_command_outputs)
+
+efiarch = {'amd64': 'x64',
+           'i386': 'ia32',
+           'arm64': 'aa64'
+          }
+grubarch = {'amd64': 'x86_64',
+            'i386': 'i386',
+            'arm64': 'arm64'
+           }
+
+def add_info(report, ui):
+    efiboot = '/boot/efi/EFI/ubuntu'
+    if command_available('efibootmgr'):
+        report['EFIBootMgr'] = command_output(['efibootmgr', '-v'])
+    else:
+        report['EFIBootMgr'] = 'efibootmgr not available'
+    commands = {}
+    try:
+        directory = os.stat(efiboot)
+    except OSError as e:
+        if e.errno == errno.ENOENT:
+            report['Missing'] = '/boot/efi/EFI/ubuntu directory is missing'
+            return
+        if e.errno == errno.EACCES:
+            directory= True
+    if directory:
+        arch = report['Architecture']
+        commands['BootEFIContents'] = 'ls %s' % efiboot
+        commands['ShimDiff'] = 'diff %s/shim%s.efi /usr/lib/shim/shim%s.efi.signed' % (efiboot, efiarch[arch], efiarch[arch])
+        commands['GrubDiff'] = 'diff %s/grub%s.efi /usr/lib/grub/%s-efi-signed/grub%s.efi.signed' %(efiboot, efiarch[arch], grubarch[arch], efiarch[arch])
+
+    efivars_dir = '/sys/firmware/efi/efivars'
+    sb_var = os.path.join(efivars_dir,
+                          'SecureBoot-8be4df61-93ca-11d2-aa0d-00e098032b8c')
+    mok_var = os.path.join(efivars_dir,
+                           'MokSBStateRT-605dab50-e046-4300-abb6-3dd810dd8b23')
+
+    attach_file(report, '/proc/sys/kernel/moksbstate_disabled')
+    commands['SecureBoot'] = 'od -An -t u1 %s' % sb_var
+    commands['MokSBStateRT'] = 'od -An -t u1 %s' % mok_var
+    attach_root_command_outputs(report, commands)
+    report['EFITables'] = recent_syslog(re.compile(r'(efi|esrt):|Secure boot'))
diff --git a/debian/templates b/debian/templates
 new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0d2d968
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/templates
@@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
+Template: shim/title/secureboot
+Type: text
+_Description: Configuring Secure Boot
+
+Template: shim/error/bad_secureboot_key
+Type: error
+_Description: Invalid password
+ The Secure Boot key you've entered is not valid. The password used must be
+ between 8 and 16 characters.
+
+Template: shim/enable_secureboot
+Type: boolean
+Default: false
+_Description: Enroll a new Machine-Owner Key?
+ A new Machine-Owner key has been generated for this system to use when
+ signing third-party drivers. This key now needs to be enrolled in your
+ firmware, which will be done at the next reboot.
+ .
+ If Secure Boot validation was previously disabled on your system, validation
+ will also be re-enabled as part of this key enrollment process.
+
+Template: shim/secureboot_explanation
+Type: note
+_Description: Your system has UEFI Secure Boot enabled.
+ UEFI Secure Boot requires additional configuration to work with third-party
+ drivers.
+ .
+ The system will assist you in configuring UEFI Secure Boot. To permit the
+ use of third-party drivers, a new Machine-Owner Key (MOK) has been generated.
+ This key now needs to be enrolled in your system's firmware.
+ .
+ To ensure that this change is being made by you as an authorized user, and
+ not by an attacker, you must choose a password now and then confirm the
+ change after reboot using the same password, in both the "Enroll MOK" and
+ "Change Secure Boot state" menus that will be presented to you when this
+ system reboots.
+ .
+ If you proceed but do not confirm the password upon reboot, Ubuntu
+ will still be able to boot on your system but any hardware that requires
+ third-party drivers to work correctly may not be usable.
+
+Template: shim/secureboot_key
+Type: string
+_Description: Enter a password for Secure Boot. It will be asked again after a reboot.
+
+Template: shim/secureboot_key_again
+Type: string
+_Description: Enter the same password again to verify you have typed it correctly.
+
+Template: shim/error/secureboot_key_mismatch
+Type: error
+_Description: Password input error
+ The two passwords you entered were not the same. Please try again.
diff --git a/download-signed b/download-signed
 new file mode 100755
index 0000000..0793696
--- /dev/null
+++ b/download-signed
@@ -0,0 +1,183 @@
+#! /usr/bin/python3
+
+import hashlib
+import argparse
+import os
+import re
+import sys
+import tarfile
+from urllib import request
+from urllib.error import HTTPError
+from urllib.parse import (
+    urlparse,
+    urlunparse,
+    )
+
+import apt
+
+# package_name: package containing the objects we signed
+# package_version: package version containing the objects we signed
+# src_package: source package name in dists
+# signed_type: 'signed' or 'uefi' schema in the url
+
+parser = argparse.ArgumentParser()
+parser.add_argument(
+    "package_name",
+    help="package containining the objects we signed")
+parser.add_argument(
+    "package_version",
+    help="package version containing the objects we signed, or 'current'")
+parser.add_argument(
+    "src_package",
+    help="source package name in dists")
+parser.add_argument(
+    "signed_type",
+    nargs='?',
+    default='signed',
+    help="subdirectory type in the url, 'signed' or 'uefi'")
+args = parser.parse_args()
+
+
+class SignedDownloader:
+    """Download a block of signed information from dists.
+
+    Find a block of signed information as published in dists/*/signed
+    and download the contents.  Use the contained checksum files to
+    identify the members and to validate them once downloaded.
+    """
+
+    def __init__(self, package_name, package_version, src_package, signed_type='signed'):
+        self.package_name = package_name
+        self.package_version = package_version
+        self.src_package = src_package
+
+        # Find the package in the available archive repositories.  Use a _binary_
+        # package name and version to locate the appropriate archive.  Then use the
+        # URI there to look for and find the appropriate binary.
+        cache = apt.Cache()
+
+        self.package = None
+        if self.package_version == "current":
+            self.package = cache[package_name].candidate
+        else:
+            for version in cache[package_name].versions:
+                if version.version == self.package_version:
+                    self.package = version
+                    break
+
+        if not self.package:
+            raise KeyError("{0}: package version not found".format(self.package_name))
+
+        origin = self.package.origins[0]
+        pool_parsed = urlparse(self.package.uri)
+        self.package_dir = "%s/%s/%s/%s-%s/%s/" % (
+            origin.archive, 'main', signed_type,
+            self.src_package, self.package.architecture, self.package_version)
+
+        # Prepare the master url stem and pull out any username/password.  If present
+        # replace the default opener with one which offers that password.
+        dists_parsed_master = list(pool_parsed)
+        if '@' in dists_parsed_master[1]:
+            (username_password, host) = pool_parsed[1].split('@', 1)
+            (username, password) = username_password.split(':', 1)
+
+            dists_parsed_master[1] = host
+
+            # Work out the authentication domain.
+            domain_parsed = [ dists_parsed_master[0], dists_parsed_master[1], '/', None, None, None ]
+            auth_uri = urlunparse(domain_parsed)
+
+            # create a password manager
+            password_mgr = request.HTTPPasswordMgrWithDefaultRealm()
+
+            # Add the username and password.
+            # If we knew the realm, we could use it instead of None.
+            password_mgr.add_password(None, auth_uri, username, password)
+
+            handler = request.HTTPBasicAuthHandler(password_mgr)
+
+            # create "opener" (OpenerDirector instance)
+            opener = request.build_opener(handler)
+
+            # Now all calls to urllib.request.urlopen use our opener.
+            request.install_opener(opener)
+
+        self.dists_parsed = dists_parsed_master
+
+    def download_one(self, member, filename, hash_factory=None):
+        directory = os.path.dirname(filename)
+        if not os.path.exists(directory):
+            os.makedirs(directory)
+
+        dists_parsed = list(self.dists_parsed)
+        dists_parsed[2] = re.sub(r"/pool/.*", "/dists/" + self.package_dir + \
+            member, dists_parsed[2])
+        dists_uri = urlunparse(dists_parsed)
+
+        print("Downloading %s ... " % dists_uri, end='')
+        sys.stdout.flush()
+        try:
+            with request.urlopen(dists_uri) as dists, open(filename, "wb") as out:
+                hashobj = None
+                if hash_factory:
+                    hashobj = hash_factory()
+                for chunk in iter(lambda: dists.read(256 * 1024), b''):
+                    if hashobj:
+                        hashobj.update(chunk)
+                    out.write(chunk)
+                checksum = True
+                if hashobj:
+                    checksum = hashobj.hexdigest()
+        except HTTPError as e:
+            if e.code == 404:
+                print("not found")
+            else:
+                raise
+        else:
+            print("found")
+            return checksum
+        return None
+
+    def download(self, base):
+        """Download an entire signed result from dists."""
+
+        # Download the checksums and use that to download the contents.
+        sums = 'SHA256SUMS'
+        sums_local = os.path.join(base, self.package_version, sums)
+        if not self.download_one(sums, sums_local):
+            print('download-signed: {0}: not found'.format(sums))
+            sys.exit(1)
+
+        # Read the checksum file and download the files it mentions.
+        here = os.path.abspath(base)
+        with open(sums_local) as sfd:
+            for line in sfd:
+                line = line.strip()
+                (checksum_expected, member) = (line[0:64], line[66:])
+                filename = os.path.abspath(os.path.join(base, self.package_version, member))
+                if not filename.startswith(here):
+                    print('download-signed: {0}: member outside output directory'.format(member))
+                    sys.exit(1)
+
+                # Download and checksum this member.
+                checksum_actual = self.download_one(member, filename, hashlib.sha256)
+                if checksum_expected != checksum_actual:
+                    print('download-signed: {0}: member checksum invalid'.format(member))
+                    sys.exit(1)
+
+        # If this is a tarball result then extract it.
+        here = os.path.abspath(os.path.join(base, self.package_version))
+        tarball_filename = os.path.join(base, self.package_version, 'signed.tar.gz')
+        if os.path.exists(tarball_filename):
+            with tarfile.open(tarball_filename) as tarball:
+                for tarinfo in tarball:
+                    if not filename.startswith(here):
+                        print('download-signed: {0}: tarball member outside output directory'.format(member))
+                        sys.exit(1)
+                for tarinfo in tarball:
+                    print('Extracting {0} ...'.format(tarinfo.name))
+                    tarball.extract(tarinfo, base)
+
+
+downloader = SignedDownloader(**vars(args))
+downloader.download('.')
diff --git a/openssl.cnf b/openssl.cnf
 new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5a4f734
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl.cnf
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+HOME                    = /var/lib/shim-signed/mok
+RANDFILE                = /var/lib/shim-signed/mok/.rnd
+
+[ req ]
+distinguished_name      = req_distinguished_name
+x509_extensions         = v3_ca
+string_mask             = utf8only
+
+[ req_distinguished_name ]
+
+[ v3_ca ]
+subjectKeyIdentifier    = hash
+authorityKeyIdentifier  = keyid:always,issuer
+basicConstraints        = critical,CA:FALSE
+
+# We use extended key usage information to limit what this auto-generated
+# key can be used for.
+#
+# codeSigning:  specifies that this key is used to sign code.
+#
+# 1.3.6.1.4.1.2312.16.1.2:  defines this key as used for module signing
+#                           only. See https://lkml.org/lkml/2015/8/26/741.
+#
+extendedKeyUsage        = codeSigning,1.3.6.1.4.1.2312.16.1.2
+
+nsComment               = "OpenSSL Generated Certificate"
+
diff --git a/shimaa64.efi.signed b/shimaa64.efi.signed
 new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f14323e
 Binary files /dev/null and b/shimaa64.efi.signed differ
diff --git a/shimx64.efi.signed b/shimx64.efi.signed
 new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0ac0d6f
 Binary files /dev/null and b/shimx64.efi.signed differ
diff --git a/update-secureboot-policy b/update-secureboot-policy
 new file mode 100755
index 0000000..7ec61a7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/update-secureboot-policy
@@ -0,0 +1,297 @@
+#!/bin/sh
+set -e
+
+if  test $# = 0                                                 \
+    && test x"$SHIM_NOTRIGGER" = x                              \
+ && test x"$DPKG_MAINTSCRIPT_PACKAGE" != x                      \
+ && dpkg-trigger --check-supported 2>/dev/null
+then
+        if dpkg-trigger --no-await shim-secureboot-policy; then
+                if test x"$SHIM_TRIGGER_DEBUG" != x; then
+                        echo "shim: wrapper deferring policy update (trigger activated)"
+                fi
+                exit 0
+        fi
+fi
+
+if [ "$(id -u)" -ne 0 ]; then
+	echo "$0: Permission denied"
+	exit 1
+fi
+
+do_enroll=0
+do_toggle=0
+
+efivars=/sys/firmware/efi/efivars
+secureboot_var=SecureBoot-8be4df61-93ca-11d2-aa0d-00e098032b8c
+moksbstatert_var=MokSBStateRT-605dab50-e046-4300-abb6-3dd810dd8b23
+
+SB_KEY="/var/lib/shim-signed/mok/MOK.der"
+SB_PRIV="/var/lib/shim-signed/mok/MOK.priv"
+
+OLD_DKMS_LIST="/var/lib/shim-signed/dkms-list"
+NEW_DKMS_LIST="${OLD_DKMS_LIST}.new"
+
+touch $OLD_DKMS_LIST
+
+dkms_list=$(find /var/lib/dkms -maxdepth 1 -type d -print 2>/dev/null \
+            | LC_ALL=C sort)
+dkms_modules=$(echo "$dkms_list" | wc -l)
+
+. /usr/share/debconf/confmodule
+
+update_dkms_list()
+{
+    echo "$dkms_list" > $NEW_DKMS_LIST
+}
+
+save_dkms_list()
+{
+    mv "$NEW_DKMS_LIST" "$OLD_DKMS_LIST"
+}
+
+clear_new_dkms_list()
+{
+    rm "$NEW_DKMS_LIST"
+}
+
+new_dkms_module()
+{
+    # handle nvidia module specially because it changed path
+    if ! grep -q "/var/lib/dkms/nvidia" "$OLD_DKMS_LIST" && grep -q "/var/lib/dkms/nvidia" "$NEW_DKMS_LIST" ; then
+        # nvidia module is newly added
+        return 0
+    fi
+
+    # return 0 if there is any other new module
+    env LC_ALL=C comm -1 -3 $OLD_DKMS_LIST $NEW_DKMS_LIST | grep -q -v "/var/lib/dkms/nvidia"
+}
+
+show_dkms_list_changes()
+{
+    diff -u $OLD_DKMS_LIST $NEW_DKMS_LIST >&2
+}
+
+validate_password()
+{
+    db_capb
+    if [ "$key" != "$again" ]; then
+        db_fset shim/error/secureboot_key_mismatch seen false
+        db_input critical shim/error/secureboot_key_mismatch || true
+        STATE=$(($STATE - 2))
+    else
+        length=$((`echo "$key" | wc -c` - 1))
+        if [ $length -lt 8 ] || [ $length -gt 16 ]; then
+            db_fset shim/error/bad_secureboot_key seen false
+            db_input critical shim/error/bad_secureboot_key || true
+            STATE=$(($STATE - 2))
+        elif [ $length -ne 0 ]; then
+            return 0
+        fi
+    fi
+
+    return 1
+}
+
+clear_passwords()
+{
+    # Always clear secureboot key.
+    db_set shim/secureboot_key ''
+    db_fset shim/secureboot_key seen false
+    db_set shim/secureboot_key_again ''
+    db_fset shim/secureboot_key_again seen false
+}
+
+toggle_validation()
+{
+    local key="$1"
+    local again="$2"
+
+    echo "Enabling shim validation."
+    printf '%s\n%s\n' "$key" "$again" | mokutil --timeout -1 --enable-validation >/dev/null || true
+}
+
+enroll_mok()
+{
+    local key="$1"
+    local again="$2"
+
+    echo "Adding '$SB_KEY' to shim:"
+    printf '%s\n%s\n' "$key" "$again" | mokutil --timeout -1 --import "$SB_KEY" >/dev/null || true
+}
+
+do_it()
+{
+    STATE=1
+    db_settitle shim/title/secureboot
+    while true; do
+        case "$STATE" in
+        1)
+            db_capb
+            db_fset shim/secureboot_explanation seen false
+            db_input critical shim/secureboot_explanation || true
+            ;;
+        2)
+            if [ "$do_toggle" -eq 1 ]; then
+                # Force no backtracking here; otherwise the GNOME backend
+                # might allow it due to displaying the explanation just before.
+                # Fixes LP: #1767091
+                db_capb
+                # Allow the user to skip toggling Secure Boot.
+                db_fset shim/enable_secureboot seen false
+                db_input critical shim/enable_secureboot || true
+                db_go
+
+                db_get shim/enable_secureboot
+                if [ "$RET" = "false" ]; then
+                    break
+                fi
+            fi
+            ;;
+        3)
+
+            db_input critical shim/secureboot_key || true
+            seen_key=$RET
+            db_input critical shim/secureboot_key_again || true
+            ;;
+        4)
+            db_get shim/secureboot_key
+            key="$RET"
+            db_get shim/secureboot_key_again
+            again="$RET"
+
+            if [ -z "$key$again" ] && echo "$seen_key" | grep -q ^30; then
+                echo "Running in non-interactive mode, doing nothing." >&2
+
+                if new_dkms_module; then
+                    show_dkms_list_changes
+                    clear_new_dkms_list
+                    exit 1
+                else
+                    exit 0
+                fi
+            fi
+
+            if validate_password; then
+                if [ $do_toggle -eq 1 ]; then
+                    toggle_validation "$key" "$again"
+                fi
+                if [ $do_enroll -eq 1 ]; then
+                    enroll_mok "$key" "$again"
+                fi
+                save_dkms_list
+            fi
+
+            clear_passwords
+            ;;
+        *)
+            break
+            ;;
+        esac
+
+        if db_go; then
+            STATE=$(($STATE + 1))
+        else
+            STATE=$(($STATE - 1))
+        fi
+        db_capb backup
+    done
+    db_capb
+}
+
+validate_actions() {
+    # Validate any queued actions before we go try to do them.
+    local moksbstatert=0
+
+    if ! [ -d $efivars ]; then
+        echo "$efivars not found, aborting." >&2
+        exit 0
+    fi
+
+    if ! [ -f $efivars/$secureboot_var ] \
+        || [ "$(od -An -t u1 $efivars/$secureboot_var | awk '{ print $NF }')" -ne 1 ]
+    then
+        echo "Secure Boot not enabled on this system." >&2
+        exit 0
+    fi
+
+    if [ $dkms_modules -lt 2 ]; then
+        echo "No DKMS modules installed." >&2
+        exit 0
+    fi
+
+    if [ -f /proc/sys/kernel/moksbstate_disabled ]; then
+        moksbstatert=$(cat /proc/sys/kernel/moksbstate_disabled 2>/dev/null || echo 0)
+    elif [ -f $efivars/$moksbstatert_var ]; then
+        # MokSBStateRT set to 1 means validation is disabled
+        moksbstatert=$(od -An -t u1 $efivars/$moksbstatert_var | \
+                       awk '{ print $NF; }')
+    fi
+
+    # We were asked to enroll a key. This only makes sense if validation
+    # is enabled.
+    if [ $do_enroll -eq 1 ] && [ $moksbstatert -eq 1 ]; then
+        do_toggle=1
+    fi
+}
+
+create_mok()
+{
+    if [ -e "$SB_KEY" ]; then
+        return
+    fi
+
+    echo "Generating a new Secure Boot signing key:"
+    openssl req -config /usr/lib/shim/mok/openssl.cnf \
+        -subj "/CN=`hostname -s | cut -b1-31` Secure Boot Module Signature key" \
+        -new -x509 -newkey rsa:2048 \
+        -nodes -days 36500 -outform DER \
+        -keyout "$SB_PRIV" \
+        -out "$SB_KEY"
+}
+
+update_dkms_list
+
+case "$1" in
+'--enable'|'--disable')
+    echo "Please run mokutil directly to change shim validation behavior."
+    exit 0
+    ;;
+
+'--new-key')
+    create_mok
+    exit 0
+    ;;
+
+'--enroll-key')
+    if [ -e "$SB_KEY" ]; then
+        if mokutil --test-key "$SB_KEY" | \
+                grep -qc 'is not'; then
+            do_enroll=1
+        fi
+    else
+        echo "No MOK found."
+        exit 1
+    fi
+    ;;
+
+*)
+    echo "update-secureboot-policy: toggle UEFI Secure Boot in shim"
+    echo
+    echo "\t--new-key\tCreate a new MOK."
+    echo "\t--enroll-key\tEnroll the new MOK for this system in shim."
+    echo "\t--help\t\tThis help text."
+    exit 0
+
+esac
+
+validate_actions
+
+if [ $(($do_toggle + $do_enroll)) -lt 1 ]; then
+    echo "Nothing to do."
+    exit 0
+fi
+
+do_it
+
+exit 0