Last commit made on 2014-03-21
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git clone -b applied/ubuntu/quantal-updates https://git.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/postgresql-9.1
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4de0c27... by Martin Pitt on 2014-03-18

Import patches-applied version 9.1.13-0ubuntu0.12.10 to applied/ubuntu/quantal-proposed

Imported using git-ubuntu import.

Changelog parent: 7141dbc40922ebb2056682ea3f1de99856b47137
Unapplied parent: 5b81cfd19bdccd110b2f7b13f161b4a9a3be39e9

New changelog entries:
  * New upstream bug fix release. No security issues or major data loss fixes
    this time, see release.html for details. (LP: #1294006)

5b81cfd... by Martin Pitt on 2014-03-18


No DEP3 Subject or Description header found

Gbp-Pq: 70-history.patch.

32f3d83... by Martin Pitt on 2014-03-18

Use Debian alternatives for external tools instead of hardcoded programs

Gbp-Pq: 54-debian-alternatives-for-external-tools.patch.

dc102c0... by Martin Pitt on 2014-03-18

Update pg_service.conf example to tell the Debian specific file location.

Gbp-Pq: 53-pg_service.conf_directory_doc.patch.

ea7906c... by Martin Pitt on 2014-03-18

Update tutorial README for required build dependencies.

Gbp-Pq: 52-tutorial-README.patch.

574ed8d... by Martin Pitt on 2014-03-18

Put server Unix sockets into /var/run/postgresql/ by default

Gbp-Pq: 51-default-sockets-in-var.patch.

828e7d6... by Martin Pitt on 2014-03-18

Use version specific installation directories so that several major versions can be installed in parallel.

Gbp-Pq: 50-per-version-dirs.patch.

3d7eb65... by Martin Pitt on 2014-03-18

Relax security check on private SSL key file: The file is also considered safe if it has owner and/or group "root", and if it is group-readable (unless the group is something other than root or the database owner group).

Gbp-Pq: 02-relax-sslkey-permscheck.patch.

a5e450c... by Martin Pitt on 2014-03-18

Import patches-unapplied version 9.1.13-0ubuntu0.12.10 to ubuntu/quantal-proposed

Imported using git-ubuntu import.

Changelog parent: 1a992551f8b3de9b4fab1809569bbf3fbe139d6d

New changelog entries:
  * New upstream bug fix release. No security issues or major data loss fixes
    this time, see release.html for details. (LP: #1294006)

7141dbc... by Martin Pitt on 2014-02-20

Import patches-applied version 9.1.12-0ubuntu0.12.10 to applied/ubuntu/quantal-security

Imported using git-ubuntu import.

Changelog parent: 62332262104fe777a5ed89a8afc5f959f8f2966b
Unapplied parent: cc3314af4e67f3a4b68e3e4346d2cf9d8ac5ed13

New changelog entries:
  * New upstream security/bugfix release. (LP: #1282677)
    - Shore up GRANT ... WITH ADMIN OPTION restrictions.
      Granting a role without ADMIN OPTION is supposed to prevent the grantee
      from adding or removing members from the granted role, but this
      restriction was easily bypassed by doing SET ROLE first. The security
      impact is mostly that a role member can revoke the access of others,
      contrary to the wishes of his grantor. Unapproved role member additions
      are a lesser concern, since an uncooperative role member could provide
      most of his rights to others anyway by creating views or SECURITY
      DEFINER functions. (CVE-2014-0060)
    - Prevent privilege escalation via manual calls to PL validator functions.
      The primary role of PL validator functions is to be called implicitly
      during CREATE FUNCTION, but they are also normal SQL functions that a
      user can call explicitly. Calling a validator on a function actually
      written in some other language was not checked for and could be
      exploited for privilege-escalation purposes. The fix involves adding a
      call to a privilege-checking function in each validator function.
      Non-core procedural languages will also need to make this change to
      their own validator functions, if any. (CVE-2014-0061)
    - Avoid multiple name lookups during table and index DDL.
      If the name lookups come to different conclusions due to concurrent
      activity, we might perform some parts of the DDL on a different table
      than other parts. At least in the case of CREATE INDEX, this can be used
      to cause the permissions checks to be performed against a different
      table than the index creation, allowing for a privilege escalation
      attack. (CVE-2014-0062)
    - Prevent buffer overrun with long datetime strings.
      The MAXDATELEN constant was too small for the longest possible value of
      type interval, allowing a buffer overrun in interval_out(). Although the
      datetime input functions were more careful about avoiding buffer
      overrun, the limit was short enough to cause them to reject some valid
      inputs, such as input containing a very long timezone name. The ecpg
      library contained these vulnerabilities along with some of its own.
    - Prevent buffer overrun due to integer overflow in size calculations.
      Several functions, mostly type input functions, calculated an allocation
      size without checking for overflow. If overflow did occur, a too-small
      buffer would be allocated and then written past. (CVE-2014-0064)
    - Prevent overruns of fixed-size buffers.
      Use strlcpy() and related functions to provide a clear guarantee that
      fixed-size buffers are not overrun. Unlike the preceding items, it is
      unclear whether these cases really represent live issues, since in most
      cases there appear to be previous constraints on the size of the input
      string. Nonetheless it seems prudent to silence all Coverity warnings of
      this type. (CVE-2014-0065)
    - Avoid crashing if crypt() returns NULL.
      There are relatively few scenarios in which crypt() could return NULL,
      but contrib/chkpass would crash if it did. One practical case in which
      this could be an issue is if libc is configured to refuse to execute
      unapproved hashing algorithms (e.g., "FIPS mode"). (CVE-2014-0066)
    - Document risks of make check in the regression testing instructions
      Since the temporary server started by make check uses "trust"
      authentication, another user on the same machine could connect to it as
      database superuser, and then potentially exploit the privileges of the
      operating-system user who started the tests. A future release will
      probably incorporate changes in the testing procedure to prevent this
      risk, but some public discussion is needed first. So for the moment,
      just warn people against using make check when there are untrusted users
      on the same machine. (CVE-2014-0067)
  * The upstream tarballs no longer contain a plain HISTORY file, but point to
    the html documentation. Add 70-history.patch to note the location of these
    files in our changelog.gz file.