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Branches

Name Last Modified Last Commit
speculation-v2 2019-03-27 19:58:24 UTC 2019-03-27
x86/speculation: Simplify the CPU bug detection logic

Author: Dominik Brodowski
Author Date: 2019-03-26 07:59:34 UTC

x86/speculation: Simplify the CPU bug detection logic

Only CPUs which speculate can speculate. Therefore, it seems prudent
to test for cpu_no_speculation first and only then determine whether
a specific speculating CPU is susceptible to store bypass speculation.
This is underlined by all CPUs currently listed in cpu_no_speculation
were present in cpu_no_spec_store_bypass as well.

Signed-off-by: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: bp@suse.de
Cc: konrad.wilk@oracle.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180522090539.GA24668@light.dominikbrodowski.net

CVE-2017-5715

(backported from commit 8ecc4979b1bd9c94168e6fc92960033b7a951336)
[juergh: Adjusted context.]
Signed-off-by: Juerg Haefliger <juergh@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com>

speculation 2019-03-25 18:25:02 UTC 2019-03-25
x86, modpost: Replace last remnants of RETPOLINE with CONFIG_RETPOLINE

Author: WANG Chao
Author Date: 2018-12-10 16:37:25 UTC

x86, modpost: Replace last remnants of RETPOLINE with CONFIG_RETPOLINE

Commit

  4cd24de3a098 ("x86/retpoline: Make CONFIG_RETPOLINE depend on compiler support")

replaced the RETPOLINE define with CONFIG_RETPOLINE checks. Remove the
remaining pieces.

 [ bp: Massage commit message. ]

Fixes: 4cd24de3a098 ("x86/retpoline: Make CONFIG_RETPOLINE depend on compiler support")
Signed-off-by: WANG Chao <chao.wang@ucloud.cn>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Zhenzhong Duan <zhenzhong.duan@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Cc: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
Cc: Jessica Yu <jeyu@kernel.org>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Cc: Luc Van Oostenryck <luc.vanoostenryck@gmail.com>
Cc: Michal Marek <michal.lkml@markovi.net>
Cc: Miguel Ojeda <miguel.ojeda.sandonis@gmail.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: linux-kbuild@vger.kernel.org
Cc: srinivas.eeda@oracle.com
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: x86-ml <x86@kernel.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181210163725.95977-1-chao.wang@ucloud.cn

CVE-2017-5715

(backported from commit e4f358916d528d479c3c12bd2fd03f2d5a576380)
[tyhicks: Backport to 4.15:
 - Minor context adjustment in compiler-gcc.h]
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>

master 2019-02-06 04:57:22 UTC 2019-02-06
UBUNTU: Ubuntu-4.15.0-46.49

Author: Khaled El Mously
Author Date: 2019-02-06 04:57:22 UTC

UBUNTU: Ubuntu-4.15.0-46.49

Signed-off-by: Khalid Elmously <khalid.elmously@canonical.com>

spectrersb 2018-08-28 17:31:54 UTC 2018-08-28
Bump version

Author: Tyler Hicks
Author Date: 2018-08-28 17:31:49 UTC

Bump version

lp1760099-ppc-meltdown-spectre 2018-04-05 23:41:06 UTC 2018-04-05
powerpc/64s: Wire up cpu_show_spectre_v2()

Author: Michael Ellerman
Author Date: 2018-03-27 12:01:53 UTC

powerpc/64s: Wire up cpu_show_spectre_v2()

BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1760099

CVE-2017-5715

Add a definition for cpu_show_spectre_v2() to override the generic
version. This has several permuations, though in practice some may not
occur we cater for any combination.

The most verbose is:

  Mitigation: Indirect branch serialisation (kernel only), Indirect
  branch cache disabled, ori31 speculation barrier enabled

We don't treat the ori31 speculation barrier as a mitigation on its
own, because it has to be *used* by code in order to be a mitigation
and we don't know if userspace is doing that. So if that's all we see
we say:

  Vulnerable, ori31 speculation barrier enabled

Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
(cherry picked from commit d6fbe1c55c55c6937cbea3531af7da84ab7473c3 linux-next)
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>

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