Merge lp:~mhlavink/ecryptfs/fix3 into lp:~ecryptfs/ecryptfs/ecryptfs-utils

[Michal Hlavinka]

[Michal Hlavinka (mhlavink)]

only revs >= 388

[lp:~mhlavink/ecryptfs/fix3]

393. By Michal Hlavinka on 2009-05-12

libecryptfs-swig/libecryptfs.i: fix compiling with werror

This source produced warning for different signess. Add cast to
char *.

Signed-off-by: Michal Hlavinka <email address hidden>

394. By Michal Hlavinka on 2009-05-13

utils/ecryptfs-add-passphrase.c: fix return codes

ecryptfs-add-passphrase returned nonzero if key was already in keayring,
but key is in the keyring in the end, so return zero. When passphrase was
too long it produced error message, but returned zero.

Signed-off-by: Michal Hlavinka <email address hidden>

395. By Michal Hlavinka on 2009-05-13

refuse mounting with too small rsa key (key_mod_openssl)

We can't use small rsa keys. FEK is encrypted with RSA key.
RSA key allows encryption only rsa_key_bitsize/8. We use
41 B for padding and 3 B are used in message from kernel.
So we can encrypt only rsa_key_bitsize/8-41-3 B. But when
using 512 b rsa key, it gives us only 20 B, so we can't use
ecryptfs_key_bytes > 20. Don't allow mounting with
these values. See Red Hat bug #499175.

Signed-off-by: Michal Hlavinka <email address hidden>

396. By Michal Hlavinka on 2009-05-18

decision_graph.c : allow only sane values

Restrict input to sane values only (for example ecryptfs_key_bytes).
Do not allow something like ecryptfs_key_bytes=17. Produce error
if the value is not one of the allowed values for node transaction.
Decision graph usualy returns NULL_TOK for wrong value, but NULL_TOK
is also returned by end node, so these values are treated ok. After
this change decision graph returns error if node has transitions but
no transition is used (matches input).

Signed-off-by: Michal Hlavinka <email address hidden>

397. By Michal Hlavinka on 2009-05-18

module_mgr.c: don't print empty line for piped passphrase input

Don't print empty line when using pipe for passphrase input.
In this case prompt is empty and input is no echoed, so there
is nothing in the line.

Signed-off-by: Michal Hlavinka <email address hidden>

398. By Michal Hlavinka on 2009-05-18

ecryptfs-add-passphrase: return nonzero for --fnek when not supported

When user adds --fnek and fnek is not supported by kernel, error message
is produced and e-a-p terminates, but successfuly. Return non zero.

Signed-off-by: Michal Hlavinka <email address hidden>

399. By Michal Hlavinka on 2009-05-18

ecryptfs_insert_wrapped_passphrase_into_keyring: fix return codes

ecryptfs_insert_wrapped_passphrase_into_keyring returned nonzero
if key was already in keayring, but key is in the keyring in the end
and that's the only thing we care about, so return zero.

Signed-off-by: Michal Hlavinka <email address hidden>

400. By Michal Hlavinka on 2009-05-18

verify passphrase when generating new openssl key

When creating new openssl key using ecryptfs-manager,
password is typed without echo, so ask for confirmation.

Signed-off-by: Michal Hlavinka <email address hidden>

401. By Michal Hlavinka on 2009-05-18

fix typo in ecryptfs-rewrite-file man page

Fix typo in ecryptfs-rewrite-file man page.

Signed-off-by: Michal Hlavinka <email address hidden>

402. By Michal Hlavinka on 2009-05-29

ecryptfs-rewrite-file: polish output

Minor improvement of progress output. See Red Hat bug 500813.

Signed-off-by: Michal Hlavinka <email address hidden>

403. By Michal Hlavinka on 2009-05-29

key_management: inform about full keyring

When keyring is full, mount.ecryptfs returned just -1 (ENOPERM). Now,
it informs about full keyring and pass through correct error code.

Signed-off-by: Michal Hlavinka <email address hidden>

404. By Michal Hlavinka on 2009-05-29

ecryptfs-dot-private: remove execution bit

This file should be only sourced, not executed,
so execution bit is not necessary here.

Signed-off-by: Michal Hlavinka <email address hidden>

405. By Michal Hlavinka on 2009-05-29

pam_ecryptfs: check ecryptfs support for kernel module loading

When auto-mounting, ecryptfs kernel module does not have to be
in kernel yet. ecryptfs_insert_wrapped_passphrase_into_keyring
call checks if kernel supports file name encryption, but because
this module is not loaded and because it can't load kernel module
itself since called with uid of the user, file name encryption
is not used.

Signed-off-by: Michal Hlavinka <email address hidden>

406. By Michal Hlavinka on 2009-05-29

insert fnek sig into keyring if fnek support check fails

When mounting and ecryptfs version check fails, add fnek sig
into keyring too. This is harmless and prevents situations
where file names are not decrypted because check failed.
This affects only pam_ecryptfs and
ecryptfs-insert-wrapped-passphrase-into-keyring.

Signed-off-by: Michal Hlavinka <email address hidden>

407. By Michal Hlavinka on 2009-05-29

fix EOF handling

Input was read until '\n' was found, but EOF vaules were ignored.
This led to continuous reading (and memory consuming) when eof was
hit (for example in cron tasks). This fixes Red Hat bugzilla 499367.
Bug: #371587.

Signed-off-by: Michal Hlavinka <email address hidden>

408. By Michal Hlavinka on 2009-05-29

make desktop files trusted

Make desktop files to be trusted by nautilus. This requires +x permission
on them. This fixes Red Hat bz 500638. Bug: #371426.

Signed-off-by: Michal Hlavinka <email address hidden>

[Michal Hlavinka (mhlavink)]

ping, any update on this merge?

[lp:~mhlavink/ecryptfs/fix3]

409. By Michal Hlavinka on 2009-06-24

key_management.c: don't fail if key already exists in keyring

If adding key to keyring and key is already there, it doesn't
mean there is any problem, we need that key and we have it.

Signed-off-by: Michal Hlavinka <email address hidden>

[Michal Hlavinka (mhlavink)]

ping, any update on this merge? It's over two months now...

[Dustin Kirkland  (kirkland)]

On Mon, Jul 13, 2009 at 1:48 AM, Michal Hlavinka<email address hidden> wrote:
> ping, any update on this merge? It's over two months now...

Sorry, Michal, I've been pulled off to other things. I'll get this
done by the end of the week.

Cheers,
:-Dustin

[Dustin Kirkland  (kirkland)]

Approved, with a few minor edits, per IRC.

Thanks a lot Michal for the fixes and testing!

:-Dustin

review: Approve

=== modified file 'doc/manpage/ecryptfs-mount-private.1'
--- doc/manpage/ecryptfs-mount-private.1	2009-02-03 08:50:36 +0000
+++ doc/manpage/ecryptfs-mount-private.1	2009-05-04 15:23:03 +0000
@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@
 \fBecryptfs-mount-private\fP
 
 .SH DESCRIPTION
-\fBecryptfs-mount-private\fP is a wrapper script for the \fBmount.ecryptfs_private\fP utility that will interactively prompt for the user's login password, if necessary.
+\fBecryptfs-mount-private\fP is a wrapper script for the \fBmount.ecryptfs_private\fP utility that will interactively prompt for the user's login password, if necessary. You need to be a member of \fBecryptfs\fB group to use this.
 
 .SH FILES
 \fI~/.Private\fP - underlying directory containing encrypted data

=== modified file 'doc/manpage/ecryptfs-setup-private.1'
--- doc/manpage/ecryptfs-setup-private.1	2009-03-18 22:00:04 +0000
+++ doc/manpage/ecryptfs-setup-private.1	2009-05-04 15:23:03 +0000
@@ -43,7 +43,7 @@
 
 
 .SH DESCRIPTION
-\fBecryptfs-setup-private\fP is a program that sets up a private cryptographic mountpoint for a non-root user.
+\fBecryptfs-setup-private\fP is a program that sets up a private cryptographic mountpoint for a non-root user, who is a member of \fBecryptfs\fP group.
 
 Be sure to properly escape your parameters according to your shell's special character nuances, and also surround the parameters by double quotes, if necessary. Any of the parameters may be:
 

=== modified file 'doc/manpage/ecryptfs.7'
--- doc/manpage/ecryptfs.7	2009-04-21 23:20:27 +0000
+++ doc/manpage/ecryptfs.7	2009-05-05 11:34:41 +0000
@@ -79,7 +79,7 @@
 The filename should be the filename of a file containing an RSA SSL key.
 .TP
 .B openssl_passwd_file=(filename)
-The password should be specified in a file with passwd=(openssl-password). It is highly reccomended that the file be stored on a secure medium such as a personal usb key.
+The password should be specified in a file with openssl_passwd=(openssl-password). It is highly reccomended that the file be stored on a secure medium such as a personal usb key.
 .TP
 .B openssl_passwd_fd=(file descriptor)
 The password is specified through the specified file descriptor.

=== modified file 'doc/manpage/mount.ecryptfs_private.1'
--- doc/manpage/mount.ecryptfs_private.1	2009-02-23 21:31:11 +0000
+++ doc/manpage/mount.ecryptfs_private.1	2009-05-04 15:23:03 +0000
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@
 \fBNOTE:\fP This program will \fBnot\fP dynamically load the relevant keys.  For this reason, it is recommended that users use \fBecryptfs-mount-private\fP(1) instead!
 
 .SH DESCRIPTION
-\fBmount.ecryptfs_private\fP is a mount helper utility for non-root users to cryptographically mount a private directory, ~/Private.
+\fBmount.ecryptfs_private\fP is a mount helper utility for non-root users, who are members of \fBecryptfs\fP group, to cryptographically mount a private directory, ~/Private.
 
 If, and only if:
   - the private mount passphrase is in their kernel keyring, and

=== modified file 'doc/manpage/umount.ecryptfs_private.1'
--- doc/manpage/umount.ecryptfs_private.1	2009-02-23 21:31:11 +0000
+++ doc/manpage/umount.ecryptfs_private.1	2009-05-04 15:23:03 +0000
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@
 Force the unmount, ignoring the value of the mount counter in \fI/tmp/ecryptfs-USERNAME-Private\fP
 
 .SH DESCRIPTION
-\fBumount.ecryptfs_private\fP is a mount helper utility for non-root users to unmount a cryptographically mounted private directory, ~/Private.
+\fBumount.ecryptfs_private\fP is a mount helper utility for non-root users, who ares members of \fBecryptfs\fP group, to unmount a cryptographically mounted private directory, ~/Private.
 
 If, and only if:
   - the private mount passphrase is in their kernel keyring, and

=== modified file 'src/key_mod/ecryptfs_key_mod_openssl.c'
--- src/key_mod/ecryptfs_key_mod_openssl.c	2009-04-22 09:05:00 +0000
+++ src/key_mod/ecryptfs_key_mod_openssl.c	2009-05-05 11:34:41 +0000
@@ -629,7 +629,7 @@
 		walker = walker->next;
 	}
 	if (!walker) {
-		syslog(LOG_ERR, "%s: No passwd option found in file\n",
+		syslog(LOG_ERR, "%s: No openssl_passwd option found in file\n",
 		       __FUNCTION__);
 		rc = MOUNT_ERROR;
 		goto out;

=== modified file 'src/libecryptfs/decision_graph.c'
--- src/libecryptfs/decision_graph.c	2009-04-23 16:31:05 +0000
+++ src/libecryptfs/decision_graph.c	2009-05-05 13:18:41 +0000
@@ -209,8 +209,15 @@
 		  struct ecryptfs_name_val_pair *nvp_head,
 		  struct val_node **mnt_params, void **foo)
 {
+	static int repeated = 0;
+	static struct param_node *lastnode = NULL;
 	int i, rc;
 
+	if (current != lastnode)
+		repeated = 0;
+
+	lastnode = current;
+
 	for (i = 0; i < current->num_transitions; i++) {
 		struct transition_node *tn = &current->tl[i];
 		struct ecryptfs_name_val_pair *nvp = nvp_head->next;
@@ -275,11 +282,17 @@
 				trans_func_tok_id =
 					tn->trans_func(ctx, current,
 						       mnt_params, foo);
-			if (trans_func_tok_id == WRONG_VALUE && 
-			    (ctx->verbosity || 
-			     (current->flags & STDIN_REQUIRED))) {
-			    *next = current;
-			    return 0;
+			if (trans_func_tok_id == WRONG_VALUE) { 
+				if (ctx->verbosity || 
+				    (current->flags & STDIN_REQUIRED)) {
+						if (++repeated >= 5)
+							return -EINVAL;
+						else {
+							*next = current;
+							return 0;
+						}
+				} else 
+					return -EINVAL;
 			}
 			if (trans_func_tok_id == MOUNT_ERROR || 
 			    trans_func_tok_id < 0)
@@ -627,26 +640,32 @@
 				(&(node->val), prompt,
 				 (node->flags
 				  & ECRYPTFS_PARAM_FLAG_ECHO_INPUT));
+			free(prompt);
 			if (node->val[0] == '\0' && 
 			    (node->flags & ECRYPTFS_NONEMPTY_VALUE_REQUIRED)) {
 				fprintf(stderr,"Wrong input, non-empty value "
 					"required!\n");
 				goto obtain_value;
 			}
-			free(prompt);
 			if (node->flags & VERIFY_VALUE) {
 				rc = asprintf(&verify_prompt, "Verify %s",
 					      node->prompt);
 				if (rc == -1)
-					return MOUNT_ERROR;
+					return -ENOMEM;
 				rc = (ctx->get_string)
 					(&verify, verify_prompt,
 					 (node->flags
 					  & ECRYPTFS_PARAM_FLAG_ECHO_INPUT));
+				free(verify_prompt);
 				if (rc)
 					return MOUNT_ERROR;
-				if (strcmp(verify, node->val))
+				rc = strcmp(verify, node->val); 
+				free(verify);
+				if (rc) {
+					free(node->val);
+					node->val = NULL;
 					goto obtain_value;
+				}
 			}
 			if (node->val[0] == '\0') {
 				free(node->val);

=== modified file 'src/libecryptfs/module_mgr.c'
--- src/libecryptfs/module_mgr.c	2009-04-21 17:59:16 +0000
+++ src/libecryptfs/module_mgr.c	2009-05-05 15:40:33 +0000
@@ -97,15 +97,20 @@
 		.trans_func = sig_param_node_callback}}
 };
 
-/* returns: 1 for str=="yes" or "y", 0 for "no" or "n", -1 elsewhere */
-static int is_yes(const char *str)
+/* returns: 
+ * 	on_null for str == NULL
+ *	1 for str=="yes" or "y"
+ *	0 for str=="no" or "n"
+ *	-1 elsewhere */
+static int is_yes(const char *str, int on_null)
 {
 	if (str) {
 		if (!strcmp(str,"y") || !strcmp(str,"yes"))
 			return 1;
 		if (!strcmp(str,"no") || !strcmp(str,"n"))
 			return 0;
-	}
+	} else
+		return on_null;
 
 	return -1;
 }
@@ -120,7 +125,7 @@
 {
 	int rc;
 
-	if (((rc=is_yes(node->val)) == 1) || (node->flags & PARAMETER_SET)) {
+	if (((rc=is_yes(node->val, 0)) == 1) || (node->flags & PARAMETER_SET)) {
 		rc = stack_push(head, opt_name);
 	} else if (rc == -1)
 		rc = WRONG_VALUE;
@@ -227,7 +232,7 @@
 {
 	int yn, rc = 0;
 
-	if (((yn=is_yes(node->val)) > 0)
+	if (((yn=is_yes(node->val, 0)) > 0)
 	    || (node->flags & PARAMETER_SET)) {
 		int i;
 		struct val_node *val_node;

=== modified file 'src/utils/ecryptfs-setup-private'
--- src/utils/ecryptfs-setup-private	2009-03-24 19:38:23 +0000
+++ src/utils/ecryptfs-setup-private	2009-05-04 15:23:03 +0000
@@ -188,6 +188,11 @@
 	id "$USER" >/dev/null || error "User [$USER] does not exist"
 fi
 
+# Check if user is member of ecryptfs group
+if ! groups "$USER" | sed  -e 's| |\n|g' | grep -n 'ecryptfs$'; then
+       error "User needs to be a member of ecryptfs group"
+fi
+
 # Obtain the user's home directory
 HOME=`getent passwd "$USER" | awk -F: '{print $6}'`
 if [ ! -d "$HOME" ]; then