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Name Last Modified Last Commit
pti/trusty-retpoline-intelv1 2018-02-22 12:09:21 UTC 2018-02-22
UBUNTU: [Packaging] final-checks -- check for empty retpoline files

Author: Andy Whitcroft
Author Date: 2018-02-22 11:47:31 UTC

UBUNTU: [Packaging] final-checks -- check for empty retpoline files

BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1751021
Signed-off-by: Andy Whitcroft <apw@canonical.com>

pti/artful-speculation-control-intel 2018-02-09 16:18:21 UTC 2018-02-09
UBUNTU: SAUCE: turn off IBPB when full retpoline is present

Author: Andy Whitcroft
Author Date: 2018-02-08 20:37:45 UTC

UBUNTU: SAUCE: turn off IBPB when full retpoline is present

CVE-2017-5715 (Spectre v2 Intel)

When we have full retpoline enabled then we do not actually require IBPB
flushes when entering the kernel. Add a new use_ibpb bit to represent
when we have retpoline enabled. Further split the enable bit into two
0x1 representing whether entry IBPB is enabled and 0x10 representing
whether kernel flushes for userspace/VMs etc are applied.

Signed-off-by: Andy Whitcroft <apw@canonical.com>

pti/xenial-speculation-control-intel 2018-02-09 16:18:01 UTC 2018-02-09
UBUNTU: SAUCE: turn off IBPB when full retpoline is present

Author: Andy Whitcroft
Author Date: 2018-02-08 20:37:45 UTC

UBUNTU: SAUCE: turn off IBPB when full retpoline is present

CVE-2017-5715 (Spectre v2 Intel)

When we have full retpoline enabled then we do not actually require IBPB
flushes when entering the kernel. Add a new use_ibpb bit to represent
when we have retpoline enabled. Further split the enable bit into two
0x1 representing whether entry IBPB is enabled and 0x10 representing
whether kernel flushes for userspace/VMs etc are applied.

Signed-off-by: Andy Whitcroft <apw@canonical.com>

pti/artful-retpoline-intelv1--pull2 2018-02-06 16:23:56 UTC 2018-02-06
x86/retpoline: Simplify vmexit_fill_RSB()

Author: Borislav Petkov
Author Date: 2018-01-27 16:24:33 UTC

x86/retpoline: Simplify vmexit_fill_RSB()

CVE-2017-5715 (Spectre v2 retpoline)
BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1747507

commit 1dde7415e99933bb7293d6b2843752cbdb43ec11

Simplify it to call an asm-function instead of pasting 41 insn bytes at
every call site. Also, add alignment to the macro as suggested here:

  https://support.google.com/faqs/answer/7625886

[dwmw2: Clean up comments, let it clobber %ebx and just tell the compiler]

Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: ak@linux.intel.com
Cc: dave.hansen@intel.com
Cc: karahmed@amazon.de
Cc: arjan@linux.intel.com
Cc: torvalds@linux-foundation.org
Cc: peterz@infradead.org
Cc: bp@alien8.de
Cc: pbonzini@redhat.com
Cc: tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com
Cc: gregkh@linux-foundation.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1517070274-12128-3-git-send-email-dwmw@amazon.co.uk
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

(cherry picked from commit 6a6a9c38986e9c4bcfdc53fba7b915a6ab834ce1)
Signed-off-by: Andy Whitcroft <apw@canonical.com>

pti/xenial-retpoline-intelv1--pull 2018-02-05 09:21:26 UTC 2018-02-05
arm: no osb() implementation yet

Author: Andy Whitcroft
Author Date: 2018-01-12 15:08:00 UTC

arm: no osb() implementation yet

CVE-2017-5753 (Spectre v1 Intel)

Signed-off-by: Andy Whitcroft <apw@canonical.com>

pti/artful-retpoline-intelv1--pull 2018-02-04 14:47:15 UTC 2018-02-04
x86/unwind: Fix dereference of untrusted pointer

Author: Josh Poimboeuf
Author Date: 2017-10-10 01:20:02 UTC

x86/unwind: Fix dereference of untrusted pointer

Tetsuo Handa and Fengguang Wu reported a panic in the unwinder:

  BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 000001f2
  IP: update_stack_state+0xd4/0x340
  *pde = 00000000

  Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
  CPU: 0 PID: 18728 Comm: 01-cpu-hotplug Not tainted 4.13.0-rc4-00170-gb09be67 #592
  Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.9.3-20161025_171302-gandalf 04/01/2014
  task: bb0b53c0 task.stack: bb3ac000
  EIP: update_stack_state+0xd4/0x340
  EFLAGS: 00010002 CPU: 0
  EAX: 0000a570 EBX: bb3adccb ECX: 0000f401 EDX: 0000a570
  ESI: 00000001 EDI: 000001ba EBP: bb3adc6b ESP: bb3adc3f
   DS: 007b ES: 007b FS: 00d8 GS: 0000 SS: 0068
  CR0: 80050033 CR2: 000001f2 CR3: 0b3a7000 CR4: 00140690
  DR0: 00000000 DR1: 00000000 DR2: 00000000 DR3: 00000000
  DR6: fffe0ff0 DR7: 00000400
  Call Trace:
   ? unwind_next_frame+0xea/0x400
   ? __unwind_start+0xf5/0x180
   ? __save_stack_trace+0x81/0x160
   ? save_stack_trace+0x20/0x30
   ? __lock_acquire+0xfa5/0x12f0
   ? lock_acquire+0x1c2/0x230
   ? tick_periodic+0x3a/0xf0
   ? _raw_spin_lock+0x42/0x50
   ? tick_periodic+0x3a/0xf0
   ? tick_periodic+0x3a/0xf0
   ? debug_smp_processor_id+0x12/0x20
   ? tick_handle_periodic+0x23/0xc0
   ? local_apic_timer_interrupt+0x63/0x70
   ? smp_trace_apic_timer_interrupt+0x235/0x6a0
   ? trace_apic_timer_interrupt+0x37/0x3c
   ? strrchr+0x23/0x50
  Code: 0f 95 c1 89 c7 89 45 e4 0f b6 c1 89 c6 89 45 dc 8b 04 85 98 cb 74 bc 88 4d e3 89 45 f0 83 c0 01 84 c9 89 04 b5 98 cb 74 bc 74 3b <8b> 47 38 8b 57 34 c6 43 1d 01 25 00 00 02 00 83 e2 03 09 d0 83
  EIP: update_stack_state+0xd4/0x340 SS:ESP: 0068:bb3adc3f
  CR2: 00000000000001f2
  ---[ end trace 0d147fd4aba8ff50 ]---
  Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt

On x86-32, after decoding a frame pointer to get a regs address,
regs_size() dereferences the regs pointer when it checks regs->cs to see
if the regs are user mode. This is dangerous because it's possible that
what looks like a decoded frame pointer is actually a corrupt value, and
we don't want the unwinder to make things worse.

Instead of calling regs_size() on an unsafe pointer, just assume they're
kernel regs to start with. Later, once it's safe to access the regs, we
can do the user mode check and corresponding safety check for the
remaining two regs.

Reported-and-tested-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Reported-and-tested-by: Fengguang Wu <fengguang.wu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Byungchul Park <byungchul.park@lge.com>
Cc: LKP <lkp@01.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Fixes: 5ed8d8bb38c5 ("x86/unwind: Move common code into update_stack_state()")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/7f95b9a6993dec7674b3f3ab3dcd3294f7b9644d.1507597785.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

(cherry picked from commit 62dd86ac01f9fb6386d7f8c6b389c3ea4582a50a)
BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1747263
Signed-off-by: Andy Whitcroft <apw@canonical.com>

master-next 2018-02-02 16:14:07 UTC 2018-02-02
x86/mm: Fix overlap of i386 CPU_ENTRY_AREA with FIX_BTMAP

Author: William Grant
Author Date: 2018-01-30 11:22:55 UTC

x86/mm: Fix overlap of i386 CPU_ENTRY_AREA with FIX_BTMAP

BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1745118

Since commit 92a0f81d8957 ("x86/cpu_entry_area: Move it out of the
fixmap"), i386's CPU_ENTRY_AREA has been mapped to the memory area just
below FIXADDR_START. But already immediately before FIXADDR_START is the
FIX_BTMAP area, which means that early_ioremap can collide with the entry
area.

It's especially bad on PAE where FIX_BTMAP_BEGIN gets aligned to exactly
match CPU_ENTRY_AREA_BASE, so the first early_ioremap slot clobbers the
IDT and causes interrupts during early boot to reset the system.

The overlap wasn't a problem before the CPU entry area was introduced,
as the fixmap has classically been preceded by the pkmap or vmalloc
areas, neither of which is used until early_ioremap is out of the
picture.

Relocate CPU_ENTRY_AREA to below FIX_BTMAP, not just below the permanent
fixmap area.

Fixes: commit 92a0f81d8957 ("x86/cpu_entry_area: Move it out of the fixmap")
Signed-off-by: William Grant <william.grant@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/7041d181-a019-e8b9-4e4e-48215f841e2c@canonical.com
(cherry picked from commit 55f49fcb879fbeebf2a8c1ac7c9e6d90df55f798 git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip.git)
Signed-off-by: Kleber Sacilotto de Souza <kleber.souza@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Kleber Sacilotto de Souza <kleber.souza@canonical.com>

master 2018-01-25 08:37:03 UTC 2018-01-25
UBUNTU: Ubuntu-4.13.0-32.35

Author: Stefan Bader
Author Date: 2018-01-25 08:37:03 UTC

UBUNTU: Ubuntu-4.13.0-32.35

Signed-off-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com>

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