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Name | Last Modified | Last Commit |
---|---|---|
pti/trusty- |
2018-02-22 12:09:21 UTC |
UBUNTU: [Packaging] final-checks -- check for empty retpoline files
Author:
Andy Whitcroft
UBUNTU: [Packaging] final-checks -- check for empty retpoline files BugLink: http:// |
pti/artful- |
2018-02-09 16:18:21 UTC |
UBUNTU: SAUCE: turn off IBPB when full retpoline is present
Author:
Andy Whitcroft
UBUNTU: SAUCE: turn off IBPB when full retpoline is present CVE-2017-5715 (Spectre v2 Intel) When we have full retpoline enabled then we do not actually require IBPB Signed-off-by: Andy Whitcroft <apw@canonical.com> |
pti/xenial- |
2018-02-09 16:18:01 UTC |
UBUNTU: SAUCE: turn off IBPB when full retpoline is present
Author:
Andy Whitcroft
UBUNTU: SAUCE: turn off IBPB when full retpoline is present CVE-2017-5715 (Spectre v2 Intel) When we have full retpoline enabled then we do not actually require IBPB Signed-off-by: Andy Whitcroft <apw@canonical.com> |
pti/artful- |
2018-02-06 16:23:56 UTC |
x86/retpoline: Simplify vmexit_fill_RSB()
Author:
Borislav Petkov
x86/retpoline: Simplify vmexit_fill_RSB() CVE-2017-5715 (Spectre v2 retpoline) commit 1dde7415e99933b Simplify it to call an asm-function instead of pasting 41 insn bytes at https:/ [dwmw2: Clean up comments, let it clobber %ebx and just tell the compiler] Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> (cherry picked from commit 6a6a9c38986e9c4 |
pti/xenial- |
2018-02-05 09:21:26 UTC |
arm: no osb() implementation yet
Author:
Andy Whitcroft
arm: no osb() implementation yet CVE-2017-5753 (Spectre v1 Intel) Signed-off-by: Andy Whitcroft <apw@canonical.com> |
pti/artful- |
2018-02-04 14:47:15 UTC |
x86/unwind: Fix dereference of untrusted pointer
Author:
Josh Poimboeuf
x86/unwind: Fix dereference of untrusted pointer Tetsuo Handa and Fengguang Wu reported a panic in the unwinder: BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 000001f2 Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP On x86-32, after decoding a frame pointer to get a regs address, Instead of calling regs_size() on an unsafe pointer, just assume they're Reported- (cherry picked from commit 62dd86ac01f9fb6 |
master-next | 2018-02-02 16:14:07 UTC |
x86/mm: Fix overlap of i386 CPU_ENTRY_AREA with FIX_BTMAP
Author:
William Grant
x86/mm: Fix overlap of i386 CPU_ENTRY_AREA with FIX_BTMAP BugLink: http:// Since commit 92a0f81d8957 ("x86/cpu_ It's especially bad on PAE where FIX_BTMAP_BEGIN gets aligned to exactly The overlap wasn't a problem before the CPU entry area was introduced, Relocate CPU_ENTRY_AREA to below FIX_BTMAP, not just below the permanent Fixes: commit 92a0f81d8957 ("x86/cpu_ |
master | 2018-01-25 08:37:03 UTC |
UBUNTU: Ubuntu-4.13.0-32.35
Author:
Stefan Bader
UBUNTU: Ubuntu-4.13.0-32.35 Signed-off-by: Stefan Bader <stefan. |
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