D-Bus Policy needs checking

Bug #318740 reported by Scott James Remnant (Canonical)
2
Affects Status Importance Assigned to Milestone
bluez (Ubuntu)
Fix Released
Undecided
Unassigned

Bug Description

bluez builds one or more binary packages that contain D-Bus system
bus services. The following were detected:

  admin/bluez etc/dbus-1/system.d/bluetooth.conf

The D-Bus policy needs checking!

It was discovered that the default policy of the D-Bus system bus was
not as was expected, due to a quirk of the language. In fact, whereas
the default policy was supposed to have been that messages would not be
allowed by default, the default was in fact that messages _were_
allowed!

CVE-2008-4311 was issued, and a new release of D-Bus was updated to
correct the default policy to be deny-by-default.

    http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2008-4311

It was quickly discovered that the policy files shipped by most services
no longer worked, and that many were (inadvertently, perhaps) relying on
the misconfiguration of the daemon.

A new version of D-Bus has been uploaded to jaunty co correct this.

Please read the following carefully to assist with updating the
configuration.

The default policy of the D-Bus system bus is:

 - Name ownership is DENIED by default.

 - Method calls are DENIED by default.

 - Replies to method calls, including errors, are PERMITTED by default.

 - Signals are PERMITTED by default.

Therefore each service MUST, in its policy configuration:

 - Permit an appropriate user to own the name it wishes to claim:

        <policy user="example">
            <allow own="com.ubuntu.Example" />
        </policy>

 - Allow method calls to be made on objects it exports, for particular
   users. This may be done in a number of different ways.

   You may simply allow all method calls to your claimed name:

        <policy context="default">
            <allow send_destination="com.ubuntu.example" />
        </policy>

   You may allow method calls to particular interfaces you export,
   especially useful if you have privileged and non-privileged
   interfaces:

        <policy context="default">
            <allow send_destination="com.ubuntu.example"
                   send_interface="com.ubuntu.Example" />
        </policy>

        <policy user="root">
            <allow send_destination="com.ubuntu.example"
                   send_interface="com.ubuntu.Example.System" />
        </policy>

    *IMPORTANT* you MUST include send_destination on ALL allow or deny
    tags. Omitting it is a SERIOUS bug!

                <!-- !! SERIOUS BUG !! -->
                <allow send_interface="x.y.z" />

        This allows any service to receive method calls of the given
        interface, not just your own service!

        It also implicitly allows any service to receive method calls
        with no interface specified, in case they match this interface!

        Using the above means you are potentially allowing exploiting of
        a different service. DO NOT DO IT!

                <!-- !! SERIOUS BUG !! -->
                <deny send_interface="x.y.z" />

        This denies all services from receiving method calls of the
        given interface, not just your own service! It also implicitly
        denies all services from receiving method calls with no
        interface specified. DO NOT DO IT!

 - You must allow standard interfaces as well, such as Introspection and
   Properties:

        <policy context="default">
            <allow send_destination="com.ubuntu.example"
                   send_interface="org.freedesktop.DBus.Introspectable" />
            <allow send_destination="com.ubuntu.example"
                   send_interface="org.freedesktop.DBus.Properties" />
        </policy>

 - You should not normally allow receipt of any messages sent from your
   interface, this is also the default.

   (ie. remove any lines of the form <allow receive_*>)

 - You do not normally need to deny any messages, this is the default.

   (ie. remove any lines of the form <deny...>)

You should fully test the service with the new D-Bus after updating the
policy, you'll need to restart the bus daemon for that (it's probably
easier to reboot).

If messages are being denied, it will be logged in /var/log/auth.log as
follows:

Dec 19 14:17:53 space-ghost dbus: Rejected send message, 1 matched
rules; type="method_return", sender=":1.26" (uid=0 pid=2966
comm="/usr/libexec/nm-dispatcher.action ") interface="(unset)"
member="(unset)" error name="(unset)" requested
_reply=0 destination=":1.18" (uid=0 pid=2806 comm="NetworkManager
--pid-file=/var/run/NetworkManager/"))

Be aware that a denied message may still happen if you have other
invalid policy installed (such as those which don't qualify allow/deny
rules with the destination!). Take the opportunity to fix all you see.

Tags: dbus-policy
Revision history for this message
Scott James Remnant (Canonical) (canonical-scott) wrote :

Definitely has a broken config (send_interface without send_destination) - no new one via fd.o yet either

Debian have a fixed one, but that relies on netdev which we don't use

Revision history for this message
Launchpad Janitor (janitor) wrote :

This bug was fixed in the package bluez - 4.25-0ubuntu5

---------------
bluez (4.25-0ubuntu5) jaunty; urgency=low

  * debian/patches/ubuntu_dbus_policy.patch:
    - Drop send_interface allow which isn't service-specific. LP: #318740.

 -- Scott James Remnant <email address hidden> Mon, 19 Jan 2009 15:38:43 +0000

Changed in bluez:
status: New → Fix Released
Revision history for this message
Marcel Holtmann (holtmann) wrote :

I can't find your patch in that package. However if you remove "<allow send_interface="org.bluez.Agent"/>" then you break it again. All other send_interface can go, but that one has to stay. It is _not_ insecure.

Revision history for this message
Scott James Remnant (Canonical) (canonical-scott) wrote :

Yes it is.

That will allow all services, not just bluez, to receive method calls on that interface.

*AND* it will allow all services to receive any method without an interface.

Go read the fd.o bug again

Revision history for this message
Scott James Remnant (Canonical) (canonical-scott) wrote :

Err, no, I'm quite wrong ;-)

bluez is a bit odd with its services and invokes method calls on non-claimed names, so this is basically ok ;-)

(and the other bit only applies to the older versions of dbus, not what I put in jaunty)

Revision history for this message
Marcel Holtmann (holtmann) wrote :

Keep in mind that the send_interface is limited to the root user context. Protecting that makes no sense anyway since we can just go ahead and change the policy if you wanna mess with it. The receiving side has to ensure here that the caller is valid. And at least bluez-gnome does this.

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